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The beginning of the space age was seen by many as the inauguration of a new era with 
great potential for the betterment of mankind, as well as an opening for a vast new area for future 
military uses and conflict. The global public interest in outer space was recognized by the 
international community with the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,1 which had been 
negotiated through the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS). The Treaty has been ratified or signed by 125 States.  It is widely considered to be 
the constitution of outer space and the foundation of the international legal regime governing all 
outer space activities. Some of the Outer Space Treaty’s provisions have been further elaborated 
in four separate agreements.2 In addition to a few other important law-making treaties,3 these 
collectively form the current international regime governing outer space and space activities. 
The legal principles of current international space law, especially the Outer Space Treaty, 
recognize the inclusive interest of the international community — that is, the global public 
interest — in outer space by assuring all States the right of free access to outer space without 
                                                 
1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter referred to as the Outer Space Treaty); opened for signature on 27 
January 1967, entered into force on 10 October 1967; 98 ratifications and 27 signatures (as of 1 January 2005), 18 
UST 2410, TIAS 6347, 610 UNTS 205. 
2 The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space (the “Rescue Agreement,” adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2345 (XXII)), opened for 
signature on 22 April 1968, entered into force on 3 December 1968; 88 ratifications, 25 signatures, and 1 acceptance 
of rights and obligations (as of 1 January 2005), 19 UST 7570, TIAS 6599, 672 UNTS 119. The Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention,” adopted by the General 
Assembly in its resolution 2777 (XXVI)), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 
September 1972; 82 ratifications, 25 signatures, and 2 acceptances of rights and obligations (as of 1 January 2005), 
24 UST 2389, TIAS 7762, 961 UNTS 187. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(the “Registration Convention,” adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 3235 (XXIX)), opened for 
signature on 14 January 1975, entered into force on 15 September 1976; 45 ratifications, 4 signatures, and 2 
acceptances of rights and obligations (as of 1 January 2005), 28 UST 695, TIAS 8480, 1023 UNTS 15. The 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement,” 
adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/68), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, entered into 
force on 11 July 1984; 11 ratifications and 5 signatures (as of 1 January 2005), 18 ILM 1434, 1363 UNTS 3. 
3 including, among others: the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 (191 ratifications as of 1 June 2004); 
Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union with Annex, 1994 (as amended in 
Marrakesh in 2004) and ITU Radio Regulations, Edition of 2004 (189 ratifications, as of 1 June 2004); Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 5 August 1963 (125 
ratifications and 10 signatures, as of 1 February 2004), 14 UST 1313, TIAS 5433, 480 UNTS 43; The Convention 
Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, opened for signature on 21 
May 1974 in Brussels; entered into force on 25 August 1979; (26 ratifications and 10 signatures 10 as of 1 January 
2004), 1144 UNTS 3; and the International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, 




discrimination of any kind. This paper analyses the current international legal regime regulating 
space activities and the contemporary challenges to the most fundamental principles of space 
law. It begins by examining the scope and nature of global public interest as primarily 
established under the Outer Space Treaty and as it applies to the exploration and use of outer 
space. 
Desiring to contribute to international cooperation in the scientific and the legal aspects 
of the exploration and use of outer space, those who drafted the Outer Space Treaty intentionally 
kept its scope broad enough to govern all future space activities. Therefore, the Treaty not only 
contains fundamental legal principles but also the guiding philosophy for the governance of outer 
space. Because of the lack of progress in the further development of international space law, this 
paper considers what should be done at the international level to strengthen the legal norms 
relating to future space activities, i.e., what specific steps the international community might take 
in the legal arena to move from lex lata (what the law is) to de lex ferenda (what the law should 
be). 
The advent of the space age opened great prospects for the economic and social well-
being of all human beings. The international law-making process has produced basic legal 
principles that represent a fair balance of interests between developed and developing countries. 
However, growing pressure by a number of countries for increased privatization, 
commercialization, deregulation, and globalization, along with recent changes in the global 
geopolitical situation, are creating disturbing disagreements about the interpretation of the 
Treaty, its implementation, and the direction of future legal development. The advancement of 
exclusive national interests could not only mar progress toward global betterment but also 
threaten human civilization in ways that might lead to its destruction. This paper discusses 
unilateral space policies, various areas of space use (such as launch services, 
telecommunications, remote sensing, navigation services, and military uses), and the latest 
policies for the exploration and use of outer space, to examine whether they are in accord with 
the letter and spirit of the current international legal regime. It finds that the several unilateral 
policies and activities that are purportedly justified under (unfettered) freedom of use, without 





Finally, this paper identifies areas where existing agreements are inadequate to cover the 
subject matter they are meant to address and where important areas of space activity are not 
covered by the current legal regime. Several suggestions are made regarding future regulatory 
initiatives that the international community ought to undertake to ensure that outer space remains 
available for the genuinely peaceful purposes, for the betterment of all human beings, for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and thus for the global public interest in outer 
space. 
Understanding the global public interest in outer space 
Before one tries to describe, or analyze the challenges to, the global public interest within 
the current international space regime, it is important that the following points be kept in mind: 
(i) The current international space regime is based on broad legal principles that must be 
understood, by taking into account that the object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty are to 
enhance and protect the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space 
for peaceful purposes. 
(ii) The international space regime contains innovative legal principles, which must be 
understood and applied as originally conceived rather than from the perspectives of traditional 
legal rules adopted before the start of the space age or contemporary nationalistic policies and 
initiatives. 
(iii) The Outer Space Treaty is not a collection of idealistic goals without legal 
implications. The intention of the authors of the Treaty was clearly to create binding obligations. 
These principles must be interpreted as legally authoritative norms that govern international 
relations in all matters relating to outer space. 
(iv) The Outer Space Treaty presents a new world order in the exploration and use of 
outer space, the full respect of which is indispensable to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, which is the ultimate purpose of international law and order. 
(v) The principles of the current international space regime, particularly the provisions of 




international rules of treaty interpretation.4 Interpretation based primarily on nationalistic 
perspectives is not legally valid. “No one party to a treaty can impose its particular interpretation 
of the treaty upon the other parties.”5 An authentic interpretation of a treaty is the one that has 
either been agreed upon by all parties to the treaty or determined by an appropriate judicial body. 
International courts and tribunals are often called upon to rule on disputes over 
interpretation of specific treaties. At least three out of four cases before the International Court of 
Justice involve treaty interpretations. According to the International Court of Justice, “The 
interpretation of the terms of a Treaty … [can]not be considered as a question essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a State, it is a question of international law which, by its very nature, 
lies within the competence of the Court.”6 In this task, the Court normally applies Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention, which is considered to be the most authoritative and important rule of 
international law with regard to the interpretation of treaties. The Article specifies that, “A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”7
The good faith (bona fide) principle is very important not only in the interpretation of a 
treaty but also in its application. The cardinal principle of treaty law, which is that a State Party 
                                                 
4 For this purpose, the most important and pertinent tool is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
adopted on 22 May 1969, opened for signature on 23 May 1969, and entered into force on 27 January 1980 
(hereinafter referred to as Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), 1155 UNTS 331; also available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm#abstract (accessed 20 June 2004). The Convention, which is believed to 
have codified the existing customary international law of treaties, provides rules for interpretation of international 
treaties. These rules, from Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation, are: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given 
to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” From Article 32: Supplementary Means of Interpretation: 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or 
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
5 Wikipedia, s.v. “Treaty,” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty#Interpretation (accessed 23 July 2005). 
6 International Court of Justice, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First 
Phase), Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, available at http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/ 
icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ibhrsummary500330.htm (accessed 23 July 2005). 




to a treaty “must perform its obligation in good faith” (pacta sunt servanda),8 is in fact the 
foundation of relations amongst civilized nations that are expected to respect the rule of law and 
not to follow the rule of national force. 
If a State Party to a treaty does not fulfill its obligations in good faith and acts contrary to 
(i.e., causes a material breach of) its provisions, the other State Party becomes entitled to “invoke 
the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect 
to itself.”9 Such an action or breach may consist of “the violation of a provision essential to the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.”10
In addition to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, one also finds in the Articles 18, 
19, 20 (2), 41 (1)(b)(ii) and 58 (1)(b)(ii), the importance of the determination of “object and 
purpose of a treaty.” In 2001, the International Court of Justice, in the LaGrand case, decided to 
examine the object and purpose of the international treaty together with the context of its 
provision at issue.11 The context is determined from the text of the treaty itself, the preamble and 
the annexes, and so on. Moreover, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, the Court emphasized that “an 
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”12 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention 
provides for the use of supplementary means of interpretation, which include the preparatory 
work of the treaty (i.e., ‘travaux préparatoires’) and the circumstances of conclusion of the treaty 
at issue. Therefore, the preamble of a treaty though may be considered to have less legal force 
than the operative part of the treaty but is extremely important and relevant in the determination 
of the proper and precise meaning of the provisions, especially of those treaties which establish 
general legal principles, such as the Outer Space Treaty. 
Therefore, the object, purpose, context, history of negotiation and ratification, and 
circumstances during the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty make the meaning of the broadly 
                                                 
8 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 26. 
9 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60(2)(c). 
10 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60(3). 
11 International Court of Justice, Germany v. United States of America (LaGrand Case), Judgment of 27 June 
2001, General List No. 104, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (accessed 23 
July 2005). Also see, infra note 169 and the accompanying text. 
12 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 




worded principles precisely clearer and establish what one may call the ‘spirit’ or driving force 
of the Treaty. An action contrary to this spirit would result in the repudiation of this constitution 
of outer space. It is not only the narrowly defined letter but the broadly worded obligatory 
principles that must be respected; otherwise the whole space legal regime may collapse. 
This paper makes extensive use of the negotiation and ratification history in order to 
demonstrate the reasons behind the specific language of the Treaty and the precise meaning of its 
particular provisions so that they should be appropriately interpreted and understood. 
1. Nature and Scope of the Global Public Interest in Outer Space 
The principle of global public interest in outer space, as recognized under the current 
international space regime, has the following components that determine its nature and scope. 
1.1. Space activities, for the benefit and in the interests of all countries 
The Outer Space Treaty, in its Article I, Paragraph 1, declares that, “The exploration and 
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development.” Through the strong and well articulated proposal of Brazil, this ‘common interest’ 
principle was included in the operative part of the Treaty rather than only in its Preamble. The 
Brazilian proposal ensured the recognition of outer space and the celestial bodies as a ‘global 
commons,’ a ‘public good,’ and placed inclusive interests of the international community over 
possible exclusive claims by individual States. The most important implication of this provision 
is that it initiated the principle of global public interest in outer space, thereby establishing that 
the interests, both present and future, of all States must be taken into consideration in the 
exploration and use of outer space. 
Acceptance of the above-mentioned Brazilian proposal by all member States of the 
COPUOS, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, was a prerequisite for 
compromise on other parts of the draft Outer Space Treaty and its final adoption by the UN 
General Assembly. After the completion of the draft treaty in the COPUOS, the U.S. delegate 




produced a treaty which established a fair balance between the interests and obligations of all 
concerned, including the countries which had as yet undertaken no space activities.”13 Similarly, 
the Soviet delegate stated that Article I, Paragraph 1, was not “a mere statement of the rights of 
States” but was designed “to guarantee that the interests, not only of individual States, but of all 
countries and of the international community as a whole, would be protected.”14 In this context, it 
is important to keep in mind that though normally a State Party to a Treaty is obliged to respect 
the corresponding rights of other States Parties to that Treaty, the International Court of Justice 
has recently accorded recognition to the obligations under certain Treaties that are of 
fundamental and broad nature — and the Outer Space Treaty is certainly one of them — that are 
incumbent upon States towards the international community as a whole (‘obligations erga 
omnes’).15
The ‘common interest’ in outer space is reinforced by other principles of international 
space law, including the ‘freedom of outer space’ and ‘non-appropriation of outer space.’16
1.2. Freedom of exploration and use of outer space 
Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Outer Space Treaty17 laid down the fundamental legal 
principle of freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all States. It also categorically and 
unambiguously denied any and all claims to national sovereignty, especially traditional territorial 
                                                 
13 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, First Committee, Summary Records of 
Meetings, 20 September–17 December 1966, U.N., New York, pp. 427-428. Emphasis added. 
14 U.N. Document A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57, 20 October 1966, p. 12. 
15 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, 1970 ICJ Reports 3. For detailed analysis, see “The Appearance of 
the Concept of Obligations Erga Omnes on the Agenda: The Dictum of the International Court in the Barcelona 
Traction Case“ in Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, available at 
www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-829870-6.pdf (accessed 23 July 2005); Crawford, James, Responsibility to the 
International Community as a Whole, available at http://lcil.law.cam.ac.uk/ Snyderlect00(f).doc (accessed 23 July 
2005). 
16 According to Carl Christol, “the prohibition against national appropriation must be read in connection with the 
provision of Article I, Paragraph 1, of the Principles [1967 Outer Space] Treaty where it is ordained that equal and 
non-discriminatory exploration and use shall prevail. These provisions must also be related to the major provisions 
of Article I, par. 2, namely, that such exploration and use are to be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
countries and all mankind. ... Exclusive rights may not exist even though the practical capabilities of some explorers, 
users, and exploiters may be greater than others”: Christol, Carl, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, 
1982, pp. 47-48. 
17 “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States 
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall 




sovereignty, to outer space and celestial bodies. However, freedom to explore and use outer 
space is not absolute and thus can be exercised only within the limitations prescribed by law.18 
While Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Outer Space Treaty grants freedom of action, it also specifies 
that this freedom must be exercised “without discrimination of any kind,” “on a basis of 
equality,” and “in accordance with international law.” 
The phrase “without discrimination of any kind,” read in conjunction with the Preamble 
and provisions of Article I, Paragraph 1, of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, implies that the delayed 
use by some States is not a reason for their freedom to be jeopardized by the first comers. This 
Article was designed to ensure the freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all States as 
well as to restrict unfettered freedom of States in such exploration and use. The phrase “on the 
basis of equality” refers to de jure equality or “sovereign equality” as recognized in Article 2(1) 
of the Charter of the United Nations,19 and thus affirms the equal rights of all States to explore 
and use outer space.20 The phrase “in accordance with international law,” should be understood 
to imply the application of principles and rules of general international law that are consistent 
with the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. In this regard, Manfred Lachs asserts that “Some 
rules [of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations] cannot be applied to 
outer space ex definitione. Some others are of the nature of lex specialis for specific 
environments.”21 In cases of inconsistency between principles and rules of space law and those 
of general international law, the former prevail, given the applicability of the principle of lex 
specialis derogat generali. 
                                                 
18 Jenks, C.W. and Larson, A., (ed.), Sovereignty Within the Law, 1965, p. 433: the “sovereignty of the State 
consists of its competence as defined and limited by international law and is not a discretionary power which 
overrides the law.” Similarly, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice said that “States are sovereign; but this does not imply for 
them an unlimited freedom of action,” in “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law,” 92, Recueil des cours, 1957, at p. 49. 
19 Dickinson, E. D., The Equality of States in International Law, 1920, at p. 3: “International persons (States) are 
equal before the law when they are equally protected in the enjoyment of their rights and equally compelled to fulfill 
their obligations.” 
20 In fact it was perceived and realized even at the time of negotiating the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that the 
application of territorial sovereignty in non-sovereignty areas like outer space would not be without some 
difficulties. During the discussions concerning the draft Treaty, the French delegate expressed his Government’s 
views that, “there would no doubt be some difficulty in implementing the Treaty, whose provisions clearly 
constituted an innovation from the standpoint of traditional international law based on the sovereignty of States”: 
See Official Record of the General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, First Committee, Summary Records of 
Meetings, 20 September–17 December 1966, UN, New York, p. 429. 




Freedom in outer space is not unrestricted and must be exercised subject to the 
predominant ‘common interest’ principle. In space law, the ‘general presumption in favor of 
freedom of action’ is not applicable. In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Lotus case22 declared that ‘restrictions upon the independence of States cannot be presumed.’ 
Therefore, some analysts have argued that ‘whatever is not prohibited is allowed’ is a rule of 
international law that applies to the exploration and use of outer space. However, for the 
following reasons it is difficult to agree with such an assertion: 
First, the Lotus case was decided with the President’s deciding vote, since the Court was 
divided equally. In fact, the Court’s opinion on the presumption in favor of sovereignty or 
freedom of action was not necessary (i.e., it was only an obiter dicum) for the resolution of the 
real controversy involved in this case. Both opinions, the obiter element as well as the reasoning 
of real issue, were extensively criticized in later years. For example, according to Brownlie, the 
Permanent Court’s “emphasis on State discretion is contradicted by the views of the International 
Court in the Fisheries and Nottebohm cases, which concerned the comparable competences of 
States, respectively, to delimit the territorial sea and to confer nationality on individuals.”23 The 
judgment of the Permanent Court in the Lotus case was rejected by subsequent international 
conventions.24
Second, international law, like any other law, is not static but dynamic and has evolved 
from the ‘law of co-existence’ to the ‘law of cooperation.’ The world has become an 
international community and ‘humankind as an international entity’ is increasingly gaining 
recognition.25 The Covenants of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations 
                                                 
 
22 Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of the S.S. “Lotus,” Judgment No. 9, September 7th, 1927, 
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus/ (accessed 02 June 2004). 
23 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 2003, p.301. 
24 For example, (a) the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Penal 
Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision and other Incidents of Navigation signed on May 10, 1952 (available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/doc/multi_909.pdf ), (b) Article 11 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
(available at http://www.un.org/law/ ilc/texts/hseas.htm), and (c) Article 27 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_over view_convention.htm), 
contain provisions with respect to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction over a ship of the flag State, a rule contrary to 
that enunciated in the Lotus case. 
25 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, 1970 ICJ Reports 3. Also see, Statute of the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda, adopted by Security Council, Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1994); International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 




have played an effective part in the development of current international law, which is based 
primarily on interdependence and international cooperation rather than merely on strict 
observation of State sovereignty and independence. “The traditional system of international 
law,” observes Friedmann, “regulates the rules of co-existence between sovereign States. It is 
essentially a collection of ‘don’ts (prohibitions). On the other hand, the developing ‘co-
operative’ law of nations ... bind[s] the nations, not in the traditional rules of abstention and 
respect, but in positive principles of cooperation for common interests.”26 Interdependence, not 
sovereignty, thus seems to be the determinant factor in contemporary international law. A 
number of space law experts and publicists deny the application of the Lotus case to outer space. 
For example, Lachs holds that “[t]he old principle that everything not prohibited is permitted is 
not valid today. The freedom of action is determined by the possibility of infringing upon the 
rights of others. Hence the limitation of rights and the need for cooperation and consultation in 
all cases where a State may by its activity affect the rights of others. This is of particular 
importance in regard to outer space.”27 Similarly, Vlasic opined that the “[m]ajor space powers 
have demonstrably been acting on the premise that whatever is not prohibited verbis expressis by 
the Treaty is permissible, and therefore lawful. While the document as a whole does not permit 
such an interpretation, the muddled text of article IV can be used, and has been used, to 
undermine the legally and politically sounder interpretation.”28 As early as 1962, Christol wrote 
that “[t]he Lotus Case does not constitute a precedent in favor of unrestricted national uses and 
activities in outer space.”29 It is the Outer Space Treaty that has put an end to the influence of 
Lotus by (i) stressing the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space, 
and (ii) requiring under its Article III that such activities must be conducted “in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and 
understanding.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 
1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); etc. 
26 Friedmann, W., “National Sovereignty, International Cooperation and the Reality of International Law,” 10, 
UCLA Law Review, 1963, p. 739, at p. 744. 
27 Cf. Vereshchetin, V.S., “Against Arbitrary Interpretation of Some Important Provisions of International Space 
Law,” Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1982, p. 153. 
28 Vlasic, I. A., “Disarmament Decade, Outer Space and International Law,” 26(2) McGill Law Journal, 1981, p. 
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The freedom of use of outer space does not include its ‘misuse’ or ‘abuse.’30 Under 
international law, the concept of ‘abuse of rights’ provides that States are responsible for their 
acts “which are not unlawful in the sense of being prohibited”31 but cause injury to other States. 
According to Lauterpacht, “there is no legal right, however well established, which could not, in 
some circumstances, be refused recognition on the ground that it has been abused.”32 In the 
exploration and use of outer space, the activities of certain economically and technologically 
advanced States are already being viewed as an abuse of their rights. For example, the Chilean 
delegate to the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee stated that the “exploration and use of outer space 
were lawful only if they sought to satisfy the needs of mankind as a whole, and in particular 
those of the poorest nations. Otherwise, they would constitute an abuse of rights.”33
1.3. Prohibition of national appropriation 
The ‘common interest’ principle has been elaborated and strengthened by the provisions 
of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which specify that “Outer Space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means 
of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Appropriation in the context of outer space implies 
the exercise of exclusive control or use and denial of use by others. In essence, this Article 
implies that outer space could not be appropriated to serve exclusive interests of any State. In 
this regard, Goedhuis asserted that even before the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, it “was 
realized that by denying the legality of such [sovereignty] claims the interests of the world 
community as a whole would be best served.”34
However, a small minority of authors argue that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
prohibits only ‘national appropriation’ and thus an individual or a private company could 
                                                 
30 International Court of Justice, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, United Kingdom vs. Norway, (1951), International 
Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments and Advisory Opinions, pp. 116 et seq.; also see Brownlie, I., Principles of 
Public International Law, 2003, p. 429.  
31 Brownlie, ibid. 
32 Cited in Brownlie, ibid, p. 430. 
33 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.362 (1982), p.2. 
34 Goedhuis, D., “Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rules of International 




lawfully appropriate any part of outer space.35 However, the views of the minority are not legally 
tenable. ‘National appropriation’ must be understood in a broader sense to include all forms of 
appropriation, whether governmental, public, private, or otherwise. The Treaty imposes 
international responsibility on States for national activities in space regardless of whether such 
activities are carried out by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities.36 The 
negotiating history of the Outer Space Treaty clearly shows that the intention of its drafters had 
been to fully ban appropriation in any manner or form.37 First, the Soviet Union while 
negotiating the Treaty accepted the involvement of private entities in the exploration and use of 
outer space, provided that these entities would participate only after having been authorized by 
the concerned States that would continuously supervise their activities.38 Without such an 
assurance, an agreement on this issue would have not been possible. Second, the States Parties to 
the Treaty are under clear obligation to ensure that space activities of the private entities are in 
conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.39 Third, allowing private entities to appropriate 
outer space, or a part of it, would defeat the very purpose of Article II, which contains 
comprehensive provisions prohibiting appropriation. Moreover, any act of a public or private 
                                                 
35 Gorove, S., “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” 37, Fordham Law Review, 1969, p. 349 at p. 
351; Wassenbergh, H., “Responsibility and Liability for Non-Governmental Activities in Outer Space,” in ECSL 
Summer Course on Space Law and Policy: Basic Materials, 1994, pp. 197 et seq. 
36 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Article VI. 
37 “A study of the preparatory work of the [1967 Outer Space] Treaty clearly shows that the draftsmen of the 
principle of non-appropriation never intended this principle to be circumvented by allowing private entities to 
appropriate areas of the Moon and other celestial bodies”: Goedhuis, D., “Legal Aspects of the Utilization of Outer 
Space,” 17 Netherlands International Law Review, 1970, p. 25, at p. 36. 
38 For details see, Matte, N.M., Aerospace Law, 1969, at p. 309. 
39 It has aptly been asserted that under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, “a nation which becomes a party to 
the treaty agrees to be responsible for space activities carried on by one of its governmental agencies as well as by 
any non-governmental entity. For the United States, this means that the government would accept responsibility for 
the activities of NASA as well as those of the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), etc. Furthermore, 
the government would see that such activities conform to the treaty’s provisions and also authorize and continuously 
supervise the space activities of non-governmental entities. The relationship between the U.S. Government and 
COMSAT is already defined in the U.S. Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Public Law 87-624 (76 Stat. 419)) 
and in the President’s Executive Order of 4 January 4 1965 on carrying out provisions of the COMSAT Act of 1962 
concerning government supervision, including international aspects and the role of the Secretary of State.  ... This 
article is designed to ensure responsibility for space activities, inherently international in nature, at the governmental 
level.” Staff Report on the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies: Analysis and Background Data, 1967, pp. 27-28. The 
Report was prepared to provide information on the legislative evaluation of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty 
for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the U.S. Senate and to be used by the Senate during its 
consideration of the Treaty for the purpose of advising the U.S. President on whether to ratify the Treaty. See also 
Dembling, Paul G., “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies” in Jasentuliyana, N. and Lee, R. (eds.), Manual on Space 




entity which is contrary to Article II will also defeat the purpose of Article I, Paragraph 2, which 
lays down a fundamental principle of space law, the freedom of outer space. 
From the beginning of the space age, the U.S. Government has maintained that outer 
space must remain free from appropriation by any means. When President Lyndon B. Johnson 
submitted the Outer Space Treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, he 
recalled that: 
In November 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked me to appear before the 
United Nations to present the U.S. resolution [on outer space] …. On that occasion, 
speaking for the United States, I said: “Today, outer space is free. It is unscarred by 
conflict. No nation holds a concession there. It must remain this way. We of the United 
States do not acknowledge that there are landlords of outer space who can presume to 
bargain with the nations of the Earth on the price of access to this domain....” I believe 
those words remain valid today.40
Other States also held similar views. For example, during the negotiations of the Outer 
Space Treaty in the Legal Subcommittee of the COPUOS, on 4 August 1966, the representative 
of Belgium noted that the term “‘non-appropriation,’ advanced by several delegations — 
apparently without contradiction by others — covered both the claims of sovereignty and “the 
creation of titles to property in private law.”41 This view was shared by the French 
representative, who, speaking to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 17 
December 1967, stressed that the basic principle of the Outer Space Treaty was that there was a 
“prohibition of any claim to sovereignty or property rights in space.”42 Various legal 
commentators, when interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, invariably reiterated 
similar views. For example, Manfred Lachs, who was the Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee 
of the COPUOS at the time of negotiations and adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, examined 
the text of the Treaty and concluded that the prohibition of ‘national appropriation’ in Article II 
included both sovereign rights and private property rights. He further asserted, “‘Appropriation’ 
                                                 
40 Treaty on Outer Space, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth 
Congress, First Session on Executive D, 90th Congress, First Session, March 7, 13 and April 12, 1967, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, at pp. 105-106. Emphasis added. 
41 Cited in Christol, Carl, “Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited”, IX, Annals of Air and Space Law, 
1984, p. 217, at p. 236. According to Dembling and Arons, “if an individual nation cannot claim sovereignty to any 
particular area of outer space or of any celestial body, it cannot deny access to that area”: cited in Christol, ibid. 




in the wider sense is involved. States are thus barred from establishing proprietary links in regard 
to the new dimension.”43
1.4. Respect for the rights of other States 
Under a rule of general international law, applicable to space activities as well, States 
must exercise their rights in such a way as not to infringe similar rights of other States.44 In other 
words, the legitimate interests of other States must be taken into consideration when a State 
exercises its right of freedom of use of outer space.45 This rule has been reiterated in Article IX 
of the Outer Space Treaty, which obliges all States to conduct their outer space activities “with 
due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”46 In Lachs’ 
opinion: “There can be no doubt that the freedom of action of States in outer space or on celestial 
bodies is neither unlimited nor absolute and unqualified, but is determined by the right and 
interest of other States. It can therefore be exercised only to the extent to which as indicated it 
does not conflict with those rights and interests.... There should therefore be no antinomy 
between the freedom of some and the interest of all.”47 In this context, it may be noted that under 
the U.K. Outer Space Act, when issuing a launch license the Secretary of State may impose a 
condition obliging the licensee to conduct his operations in such a way as to “avoid interference 
with the activities of others in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”48
A corollary to the rule of ‘respect for the rights of others’ is that the legitimate special 
interests of other States must also be taken into consideration when a State exercises its freedom 
of action. Just as in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the International Court of Justice gave 
                                                 
43 Cited in Christol, ibid.  
44 At its 1980 session, the International Law Commission has opined that “a universe of law postulated that the 
freedom of each of its subjects should be bounded by equal respect for the freedoms of other subjects; that States 
engaging in an activity which might cause injurious consequences internationally should take reasonable account of 
the interests and wishes of other States likely to be affected”: UN Doc. A/CN.4/334/Add.2, paras 52, 56 and 60 (cf. 
UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.369, February 15, 1982, p. 4).  
45 See the decision of the International Court of Justice in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, United Kingdom vs. 
Norway, (1951), International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments and Advisory Opinions, p. 116 et seq.; also see 
Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 2003, pp. 429-30. 
46 Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, in part, also provides that, “If a State party to the Treaty has reason to 
believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space  ... would cause potentially harmful 
interference with activities of other States parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space  ... it shall 
undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.” 
47 Lachs, Manfred, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making, 1972, p. 117.  




special effect to “certain economic interests peculiar to a region,”49 so Article 1, Paragraph 1, of 
the Outer Space Treaty also seems to recognize the ‘special interests and needs’ of developing 
countries. 
The above-discussed four legal principles incorporate the fundamental elements of the 
global public interest principle. It is generally accepted that these principles are not only legal 
norms of conventional international law but have also become a part of customary international 
law (and jus cogens) binding upon all States.50 Moreover, the global public interest in outer 
space imposes international obligations erga omnes applicable to, and enforceable by, all States. 
The principles of global public interest also finds significant support in legal norms dealing with 
the following briefly explained aspects of the international space regime: (i) space activities as 
the province of all mankind; (ii) obligation to cooperate; (iii) astronauts as envoys of mankind; 
(iv) avoidance of harmful contamination; (v) space activities by States, private entities, and 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); (vi) absolute liability for damage caused by certain 
space objects; (vii) prohibition of weapons in space and militarization of the celestial bodies; 
(viii) duty of openness and transparency; and (ix) universal application of the international space 
regime. 
                                                 
49 International Court of Justice, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, (United Kingdom vs. Norway), Judgment of 18 XII 
1951, p. 133. 
50 See Vlasic, I.A., “The Growth of Space Law 1957-65: Achievements and Issues,” Yearbook of Air and Space 
Law, 1965, p. 365, at pp. 379-380. See also Matte, N.M., Aerospace Law: Telecommunications Satellites, 1982, pp. 
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1.5. Space activities as the province of all mankind 
All space activities are international in nature because of the physical characteristic of 
outer space and because the sphere of operation of such activities is beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of any State. The nations of the world have recognized, in Article I, Paragraph 1, of 
the Outer Space Treaty, that the “exploration and use of outer space ... shall be the province of all 
mankind,” i.e., each aspect of all space activities may be discussed by the international 
community. In this context, Jenks has also asserted that it “is difficult to imagine a reasonable 
claim that any activity in space is ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of any State, 
within the meaning of Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the UN Charter.”51 It may, however, be noted 
that the concept of ‘province of all mankind’ is broader than, and different from, the legal 
principle of ‘common heritage of all mankind’ as included in the Moon Agreement (as discussed 
below under subsection 3.5 of this paper). 
1.6. Obligation to cooperate 
States are urged to cooperate with each other and to promote cooperation in the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Specifically, 
States are obliged to: 
• facilitate and encourage international cooperation in conducting scientific 
investigations;52 
• carry out space activities “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security 
and promoting international cooperation and understanding;”53 
• afford opportunities to observe the flight of space objects launched by them;54 and 
• inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public of the nature, 
conduct, locations, and results of their space activities.55 
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1.7. Astronauts as envoys of mankind 
Irrespective of their nationality, all astronauts are to be treated as “envoys of mankind in 
outer space,” hence States and their astronauts are obliged to render all possible assistance in the 
event of accident, distress, or emergency landing to the astronauts of other States.56 This 
principle of the Outer Space Treaty has been elaborated further by the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 
which obliges States (most of which are non-space-faring nations) to provide all possible 
assistance to astronauts in the event of accident, distress or emergency landing and the duty to 
promptly and safely return astronauts.57 In essence, the Rescue Agreement entails global 
responsibility to support space activities of space-faring nations, whose number still remains 
limited.  
1.8. Avoidance of harmful contamination 
To ensure that outer space activities remain beneficial to the late comers as well as to 
future generations, the current international space regime obliges the space-faring nations to 
“conduct exploration of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in such a 
way so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of 
the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, [to] 
adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.”58 Moreover, where a State has reason to believe 
that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other 
States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, it must undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with 
any such activity or experiment.59 The Outer Space Treaty attempts to achieve globally 
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58 The Outer Space Treaty, Article IX. In addition, it may be noted that with the desire “to put an end to the 
contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances,” the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 
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sustainable exploration and use of outer space not only by the contemporary civilization but by 
future generations as well. 
1.9. Space activities by States, private entities, and IGOs 
Space activities may be carried out not only by States but also by private entities that are 
their creations and by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, States Parties to the 
Outer Space Treaty are internationally responsible for ensuring that the space activities of their 
private entities would be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. For effective 
performance of this responsibility, an ‘appropriate’ State, which may be the State of registration 
of the spacecraft as determined under the Registration Convention,60 is obligated to exercise 
“continuous supervision” of its private entities engaged in space activities. Similarly, under 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, when space activities are carried out by an international 
organization, responsibility for compliance with the provisions of the international space regime 
is borne both by the international organization and by the States participating in that 
organization. State responsibility for the space activities of private enterprises is a new norm of 
international law, departing from the rules of general international law under which a State can 
be held responsible only if there is a ‘genuine link’ between that State and the activity 
concerned.61 In essence, Article VI has been designed to create a universally coherent global 
legal regime, the consistent implementation of which is the responsibility of all States Parties to 
the Outer Space Treaty, regardless of whether their space activities are carried out by public or 
private entities or by intergovernmental organizations. 
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1.10. Absolute liability for damage caused by certain space objects 
Under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, each launching State62 is internationally 
liable for damage to another State or to its natural or juridical persons caused by a space object or 
its component parts. This principle has been expanded under the 1972 Liability Convention, 
according to which a “launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage 
caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.”63 This provision, no 
doubt, could impose a heavy burden on the space-faring nations, which opposed its adoption 
during the negotiations both of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. However, 
the non-space faring States insisted on absolute liability as they believed that they could possibly 
be the victims of unforeseen catastrophic accidents. In view of the imbalanced burden placed on 
the non-space faring States under the 1968 Rescue Agreement,64 the space powers accepted, as a 
compromise, the principle of absolute liability. Similar to the principle of State responsibility 
(discussed above in subsection 1.9 of this paper), State liability for damage caused by the space 
objects of its private persons is a new principle of international law. It may be noted, however, 
that the burden of absolute liability has actually not yet been very heavy on the space-faring 
nations because there has been only one claim under this provision.65 It is also interesting to note 
that the provisions of the 1968 Rescue Agreement have been respected in several incidents66 and 
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the burden on non-space-faring States has been manageable as none of them suffered any serious 
human and financial losses. 
1.11. Prohibition of weapons in space and militarization of celestial bodies 
Believing that military activities would mar the peaceful uses of outer space and diminish 
potential benefits for all people, the States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty decided to prohibit 
(a) the placement “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction,” and (b) the militarization of celestial bodies, so that they 
could continue to be used by all States “exclusively for peaceful purposes.”67 It must be kept in 
mind that Article IV is not the only provision that limits military activities in space. The 
unambiguous objective of the outer space regime, as initiated under the Outer Space Treaty, of 
keeping space for peaceful uses has also been reinforced in its Preamble and Article III. 
1.12. Duty of openness and transparency 
The current international space regime includes a norm of transparency. States are under 
duty to inform the UN Secretary-General as well as the public and the international scientific 
community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations, and 
results of their space activities.68 Moreover, subject to certain conditions, each State is obligated 
to keep open to representatives of other States all stations, installations, equipment, and space 
vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies.69 This duty of openness, transparency, and 
accordance of visitation rights to other States, albeit weak, implies that States Parties to the Outer 
Space Treaty recognized the global public interest in outer space. Such provisions, at least partly, 
seem to have initiated the tacit acceptance of reconnaissance satellites, which was later 
developed more fully in several other agreements70 and even became one of the bases for the 
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recognition of freedom of collection and distribution of satellite remote data as recognized in the 
1986 UN Principles on Remote Sensing (as discussed below in subsection 2.3 of this paper). 
1.13. Universal application of the international space regime 
The importance of creating an international space regime with universal application was 
underlined when the Outer Space Treaty, as well as the other four space law treaties, were 
opened to all States for signature and ratification or adherence.71 In other words, this regime was 
never deliberately designed by, or to be applied only to, space powers, i.e., the States with 
economic or scientific capabilities. Global involvement, application, and benefits were and are 
intended. 
 
In brief, it can be said that the principle of global public interest in outer space has 
guaranteed an equal right of access to outer space for all States without discrimination of any 
kind. The predominant nature of this principle also implies that exploration and use of outer 
space must be in some way beneficial to the whole of mankind and in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Unilateral approaches, pursued in one’s exclusive interests in 
the exploration and use of outer space without regard to the interests of other States and of the 
whole of mankind are contrary to the global public interest in outer space. 
2. Challenges to the Current International Space Regime 
This section examines the conduct of certain important space activities with a view to 
determining to what extent the current international space regime is being followed or ignored by 
States and to assess the implications of some important national policies for the global public 
interest in outer space. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1645, TIAS 8276, opened for signature 3 July 1974; entered into force 24 May 1976; and The Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty 1996, opened for signature on 24 September 1996; not entered into force yet. 




2.1. Launch services 
Nothing fruitful can be achieved in outer space without reliable and easily accessible 
launch services. Each State may individually develop and operate its own launch vehicle, which 
involves expenditures of huge, primarily public, financial and human resources, or it may rely on 
other States for launch services. Both the Soviet Union and the United States initiated the space 
age exclusively on the basis of their own launch capabilities developed within their respective 
military missile programs. Launch technology is essentially a dual-purpose capability; a rocket is 
a missile for delivering bombs and also a launch vehicle for placing civilian satellites in orbit for 
economic or scientific purposes or military satellites for military purposes. During the Cold War, 
and even to a large extent today, launch capability is of high national significance and is an 
important economic resource. Therefore, States possessing launch technology attempt to control 
its proliferation not only for military reasons but also to maintain their political and economic 
hegemony. Sometimes political and economic reasons are disguised under security rationales. 
Several attempts to develop and control launch technology are examined below with an eye to 
the duty to cooperate prescribed by the current international space regime and in terms of 
whether they enhance or mar global public interest in outer space. 
2.1.1. Evolution of the European launcher 
One may trace the origin of Europe’s launch program to the creation of the European 
Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) around 1960. Unfortunately, no successful launch 
was achieved even during the final attempt that took place on 12 June 1970. However, the 
European States remained determined to achieve this capability. In 1975, they reorganized 
themselves by creating the European Space Agency (ESA), which combined ELDO and the 
satellite research organization, called the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). The 
drive to develop and operate European launch vehicles was intensified by U.S. attempts to 
maintain American hegemony in two related matters, the conditional launch of the first European 
satellites and the creation of INTELSAT as an American monopoly. 
The first European satellites, Symphonie A and B, were designed and constructed 
pursuant to the June 1967 agreement between the German and French governments. At that time, 




launched Symphonie A and B in 1974 and 1975 respectively using its Thor Delta launch 
vehicles, subject to conditions under which Germany and France could use these satellites only 
for experimental purposes and could not compete with the U.S.-initiated and -controlled satellite 
telecommunication provider, INTELSAT. According to Peter van Fenema, such U.S. conditions 
were “considered onerous, if not insulting, by the Europeans.”72 In response, the European 
States, particularly France, pushed for the development of European capability to provide 
independent access to space. As a result, the European States led by France decided to design, 
develop and operate the Ariane family of launch vehicles. 
Commercial support for the Ariane launch vehicles developed when the European States 
decided to create a European regional satellite telecommunications organization called 
EUTELSAT. Today, EUTELSAT is the leading player in satellite telecommunication services in 
Europe, North Africa, Middle East, and Asia.73 The creation of EUTELSAT provided a ready 
market for further growth and great commercial success of Arianespace (a European private 
company that builds and operates Ariane rockets) as well as a strong satellite manufacturing 
capability in Europe. 
Challenges to the commercial operations of Arianespace are mounting due to competition 
from the launch services of the U.S., Russia, China, and possibly India and Brazil. To prepare for 
these challenges, European States and Arianespace have adopted a policy of international 
cooperation with Russia, pursuant to which Arianespace is in a position to provide a full range of 
launch services using not only Ariane rockets but also Russian Soyuz as well as jointly 
developed Vega launch vehicles.74 The immediate future of the Ariane family of rockets seems 
to be secure, particularly in view of current U.S. regulatory policies that have the effect of 
discouraging non-Americans from using American launch services: 
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• U.S. export laws strictly control the launch of satellites containing American technology 
with the use of non-American launch vehicles;75 
• Under the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Services Act,76 a license is required for a 
private launch from within American territory by anyone and outside the U.S. territory by 
American citizens. The issuance of a license by the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation of  the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, is 
subject to, inter alia, national security and foreign policy interests of the U.S.; and 
• Under the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act77 and the 2000 Regulations Relating to 
the Licensing of Private Land Remote-Sensing Space Systems,78 the U.S. Government 
could exercise control over the operation of a foreign remote-sensing satellite, and could 
limit the collection or distribution of its data, if the satellite has been launched by an 
American launch company. For example, the launch of Canada’s RADARSAT-2 Earth-
observation satellite by Boeing, an American company, could possibly trigger the 
application of the U.S. law relating to the worldwide collection and distribution of 
RADARSAT-2 data products and derived information.79 
In 2002, Arianespace launched 10 commercial satellites out of a total of 24 launches in 
the world, and the company earned $1.13 billion out of $1.9 billion for the whole world.80 
Arianespace’s revenue in 2003 was $525 million out of $1.2 billion for the global market.81 
However, in 2004 there was an 18 percent decrease in overall global commercial launch 
revenues from 2003 to a total of approximately $1.0 billion out of which the European launcher 
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earned about $140 million primarily due to the strong entry of the multinational Sea Launch and 
Russian launch providers.82
With timely and forward-looking policy decisions and persistent joint efforts, the 
European nations have achieved independent access to space not only for themselves but also for 
a good number of other countries, which for various reasons might not be favored by the U.S. 
Government.83 Perhaps that is why India, against whom the U.S. had imposed sanctions, has 
been using Ariane launch vehicles for geostationary telecommunication satellites that are 
important for the country’s economic and social development.84 Today Ariane rockets not only 
serve Europe but also offer readily available opportunities to all nations to reap the benefits of 
space use. This initiative of the European States is important for their space programs but also 
has very positive implications for global public interest in space activities. 
2.1.2. India’s efforts to develop its own launch capability 
India is a fast-developing country that aspires to expand its own launch vehicles in order 
to have independent access to space. From the beginning of its space program in the late 1960’s, 
India has relied upon international cooperation both for the acquisition of its satellites and for 
launch services. India is a democratic country without territorial ambitions, and has managed to 
attract technological support mainly from the Soviet Union and France.  
Since the early 1980s, India has been developing its launch vehicles for low-Earth and 
polar-orbit satellites. It entered the international launch market by attracting customers from the 
European Space Agency, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Singapore, and South Korea.85 In the mid-
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1980s, India decided to develop its own Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) to 
launch geostationary satellites weighing about 2000 kilograms, similar in size and weight to its 
INSAT telecommunication satellites. This decision was based on the need to meet India’s 
domestic market for telecommunication satellites as well as to attain independent launch 
capability. For this purpose, India needed a second stage engine for its Polar Satellite Launch 
Vehicle to convert it into a GSLV and thus issued international tenders for acquiring cryogenic 
engines and technology.86 General Dynamics of the U.S., Arianespace of France, and 
Glavkosmos of Russia responded. When the American company asked for $800 million and the 
Arianespace bid was for $600 million, India selected Glavkosmos because it offered to meet 
India’s need only for $400 million. It is important to keep in mind that all three companies were 
offering to sell to India similar cryogenic technology.  The sale of the offered technology by 
General Dynamics would have raised proliferation concerns in the U.S. and the application of the 
American Export Control laws, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The 
Russian company signed a contract with the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) on 11 
January 1990 under which it undertook to supply two cryogenic engines and to build the third 
one in India, thereby transferring the required technology. On 11 May 1992, the U.S. imposed 
sanctions against Glavkosmos and ISRO as the U.S. State Department believed that this Indo-
Russian deal would violate MTCR (as discussed below in subsection 2.1.3). According to a U.S. 
State Department spokesperson, “neither the [MTCR] guidelines nor our own [American] law 
make any distinction between technology that is used in ballistic missiles and the technology for 
space-launched vehicles.”87 From a legal perspective, it is strange to accuse two States that are 
not parties to the MTCR of violating it, especially when this so-called regime is only an 
‘understanding’ amongst third States. 
In India, there was serious backlash against the American Government. “Indian 
politicians, outraged by what they viewed as ‘international dadagiri (bullying)’ and undue 
interference in the bilateral affairs of two sovereign States by the United States, denounced the 
U.S. action.”88 The concerned politicians and scientists in India felt that the U.S. had imposed 
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sanctions not because of any strategic reason, as nobody would prefer to use cryogenic 
technology for military purposes, but for economic motives, to prevent India from becoming a 
player in the international launch market. 
Russia seemed determined to honor its agreement with India, but later caved in to 
American pressure because the United States threatened to make the two-year sanctions 
permanent if Russia did not cancel its deal with India. Russia ceased transferring cryogenic 
engine technology to India but supplied the engines, which were not at issue. Indian scientists 
responded that stopping the Russian technology transfer would not end their efforts to develop 
Indian cryogenic technology. Using a Russian cryogenic engine, India completed the first 
successful test of its GSLV in April 2001. During the second test in May 2003, GSLV 
successfully placed into orbit a 1,825-kilogramme experimental telecommunications satellite.89 
In September 2004, India launched a satellite for the country’s educational network using GLSV, 
which India intends to use “to enter the lucrative commercial satellite launch market.”90 Starting 
in mid-2007, India will begin manufacturing at the rate of one per year its GSLVs to be powered 
by indigenously built cryogenic engines.91
With the perfection of GSLVs, India is in a position to launch its own satellites cheaply, 
to gain independence in its launch capability and to offer launch opportunities at competitive 
prices to international customers, especially from those countries that are not on the favorite list 
of the major space powers. Expansion and availability of launch services at competitive prices 
and on non-discriminatory basis is in the global public interest related to outer space activities. 
The U.S. has recently initiated a ‘policy of engagement’ with India possibly as a 
counterweight to China, at least in Asia. The U.S. also seems to have realized that India is 
determined to develop its independent access to space. Therefore, in addition to unprecedented 
collaboration in the strategic and nuclear fields, both countries have chosen the path of mutual 
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cooperation in the field of space activities since January 2004.92 This new rapprochement has 
recently resulted in (a) the establishment of the India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Civil Space 
Cooperation in June 2005, and (b) adoption of an understanding, on 14 July 2005, that envisions 
the building of closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation, and commercial space 
launches.93 Consultations between the two nations have revolved around various means to 
explore the possibilities of cooperation in earth observation, satellite communication, satellite 
navigation and its application, space science, natural hazards research and disaster management 
support, and education and training in space. Though these new policy initiatives have not yet 
resulted in concrete agreements about technology transfer, greater cooperation between two 
nations could probably benefit not only them but also all other countries, especially because 
India could provide launch services and other space products on a highly competitive basis. 
2.1.3. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
On 16 April 1987, the G7 countries (Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the 
U.K., and the U.S.) informally agreed to a set of policy guidelines regarding the control of 
proliferation of missile technology. By March 2005, there are 33 States that have agreed to 
adhere to these guidelines, which are known as the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR).94 The MTCR restricts the export of delivery systems, and related technology, capable 
of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, as well as systems intended for the 
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delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which include nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons.95 The term ‘missile’ under MTCR includes ballistic missiles, space launch 
vehicles, and sounding rockets. MTCR is a political undertaking and not a legally binding 
international agreement. The MTCR controls are implemented through national laws and 
regulations.96
The Peoples’ Republic of China, which possesses independently developed launch 
technology and extensive capability both for military and civilian uses, is not a party to the 
MTCR (although talks with China were conducted by an MTCR delegation in 2004). China 
administers its own national regulatory policy to control the proliferation of launch technology to 
other countries.97 Such policy seems to be considered necessary by China in view of the 
objections of the U.S. Government against missile proliferation as well as the imposition of 
sanctions by the U.S. against some Chinese organizations.98
Export restrictions apply even among members of the MTCR. For example, according to 
Peter van Fenema, when Brazil joined the group in 1995, “its accession did not result in launch 
technology becoming freely and abundantly available. And, more recently, Japan initially also 
faced difficulties on the part of the [U.S.] State Department when it bought a U.S. built (Thiokol) 
engine to power its H2A launch vehicle.”99 A question then arises, why do States join the MTCR 
group? A part of the answer could be found in what happened in the case of Russia. Russia 
embraced the MTCR so that it could (i) avoid the imposition of permanent sanctions by the U.S. 
after the Indo-Russian cryogenic engine saga (as discussed above in subsection 2.1.2) and (ii) 
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enter into bilateral launch agreements with the U.S. to be allowed to launch foreign satellites 
equipped with the American technology100 (as discussed below in subsection 2.1.4). 
According to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
“MTCR controls are not intended to impede peaceful aerospace programs or international 
cooperation in such programs, as long as these programs are not used to develop delivery 
systems for WMD. Nor are MTCR controls designed to restrict access to technologies necessary 
for peaceful economic development.”101 However, as we have seen in the case of India (as 
discussed above in subsection 2.1.2), peaceful uses of launch technology could also become 
subject to MTCR restrictions.102 In this regard, it is interesting to note the recently released 
report entitled 2005 State of the Space Industry by the International Space Business Council, 
which presents a highly positive picture of the global space industry. However, the report “cites 
U.S. export regulations under ITAR as ‘the industry’s most serious issue’ and states, ‘what 
initially was a nuisance to businesses has evolved into a serious problem for U.S. industry.’”103
2.1.4. U.S. bilateral launch agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and China 
It became clear that the underlying motivation for control by the U. S. of the proliferation 
of launch capability is essentially economic when the U.S. required Russia, Ukraine, and China 
to enter into bilateral agreements104 in order to be allowed to launch satellites manufactured in 
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the U.S. and those carrying American technology. The 1993 agreement with Russia was signed 
only after Russia agreed to comply with the MTCR and cease transferring rocket technology to 
India.105 The U.S. and China concluded a six-year agreement in January 1989 when China 
agreed that it would sign “international treaties related to liability for satellite launches and other 
subjects; agree to price its launch services ‘on a par’ with Western companies; and establish a 
government-to-government level regime for protecting technology from possible misuse or 
diversion.”106 The three bilateral agreements were designed to be transitional measures enabling 
trouble-free entry of the new space launch companies into the international market.107 The 
agreements contained provisions that (i) limited the number of satellites that could be allowed to 
be launched by each country, (ii) placed lower limits on the price that could be charged (i.e., not 
below 15% of the market economy countries’ price), and (iii) required that the terms and 
conditions offered by each country’s launch provider be comparable to those offered by market 
economy countries. The practical effect of these provisions has thus clearly been mainly 
economic and political, and not specifically military in nature.108 Under the agreement with 
Russia (as discussed above under subsection 2.1.2), the U.S. also wanted to stall the development 
of geostationary satellite launch capability by India.  
Relationships with Russia and Ukraine established under the respective agreements did 
not cause any serious problem. However, the case of China has been different because of 
controversy over possible leakage of American technology to China,109 the Tiananmen Square 
incident, and a host of other political and strategic reasons.110 These three bilateral agreements 
have now expired. A launch by any of these three countries of a satellite manufactured in the 
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U.S. and the one carrying American technology is assessed on a case-by-case basis by the U.S. 
State Department under the Export Control Act.111
In conclusion, it can be said that unilateral attempts to control the development of launch 
capabilities globally are not only contrary to the principle in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty 
of promoting “international cooperation and understanding” in space activities and consequently 
to global public interest in outer space, but also are divergent from the economic philosophy of 
market economy vigorously propagated by the U.S. Proliferation of missile technology is a 
matter of serious concern, but its control through unilateral actions in the form of unreasonable 
restrictions and sanctions has not resulted in any concrete positive results. It must be understood 
that if major space powers are resolved to maintain their own launch capabilities and control 
proliferation at the same time, other States become equally determined, especially once 
challenged, to strive for development of their own launch vehicles, which could be used both for 
civilian and military purposes.  
Multilateral efforts are required to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles — launch 
vehicles for military uses. This approach might be undertaken in different forms, such as by (a) 
adopting a Code of Conduct similar to the Russian proposal for the Global Control System 
(GCS) that would be contingent on non-proliferation commitments;112 (b) further strengthening 
the MTCR;113 or more importantly, (c) negotiating an international space launch services 
agreement, preferably through the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would provide for 
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readily available services to all member States of the WTO at competitive prices and on a non-
discriminatory basis. At the same time, such an agreement could help in controlling some 
military space activities and thus would be in the global public interest. 
2.2. Satellite communications  
Access to outer space for telecommunication purposes can be achieved either by (i) 
participation in global satellite telecommunications system(s) or (ii) through national satellite 
system (s). 
2.2.1. Participation in global satellite telecommunications organizations114 
In the field of telecommunications, the principle of non-discriminatory universal access 
to outer space (i.e., global public interest) was collectively accepted as a part of the international 
legal regime almost from the beginning of the space age. As early as 1961, the UN General 
Assembly in Resolution 1721 (D) unanimously declared that satellite telecommunication 
services should be made available on a global and non-discriminatory basis.115 Its first 
implementation was effected through the 1963 INTELSAT Interim Agreements, which were 
expanded in 1971.116 In addition to reiterating Resolution 1721(D), the Preamble of the 
INTELSAT Agreement also specified that “satellite telecommunications should be organized in 
such a way as to permit all peoples to have access to the global satellite system.” INTELSAT’s 
prime objective had been to provide “international public telecommunications services of high 
quality and reliability to be available on a non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the world.”117 
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Similar provisions had been made in the INMARSAT Convention guaranteeing non-
discriminatory (a) access to its space segment118 and (b) charges for its services.119
INTELSAT was originally an international not-for-profit organization of more than 140 
member States, and had been operated on sound commercial principles. This international 
organization had financial participation both by public and private entities, had its own legal 
personality, had been a subject of international law and thus was not governed by any national 
law and policy. Any country could use the INTELSAT system, whether it was a member or not, 
and would pay charges for all INTELSAT services on a non-discriminatory basis. Its services 
had been used by more than 170 countries and territories, thus making INTELSAT the most 
successful network for universal access to space. A fairly large number of countries, especially in 
the third world, cannot afford to have a national satellite system, nor do they need one. An 
international system such as INTELSAT has been the only means for them to have guaranteed 
access to space benefits. Conny Kullman, the INTELSAT Chief Executive Officer & Director 
General, correctly pointed out that developing countries viewed INTELSAT as their lifeline 
connection to the world.120
Regrettably, non-discriminatory universal access to space for telecommunication services 
was eliminated by the privatization of both INTELSAT and INMARSAT. In 2000, the U.S. 
adopted the “Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International 
Telecommunications Act” (ORBIT Act), which forced their dismantlement.121 The Act imposed 
several severe restrictions on INTELSAT’s operations pending pro-competitive privatization.122 
INTELSAT had expressed its unhappiness with the ORBIT Act since it considered the Act as a 
                                                 
118 Convention Establishing International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), Final Acts of 
International Conference on the Establishment of an International Maritime Satellite System, Inter-Governmental 
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119 Ibid, Article 19. 
120 Update on U.S. Legislative Issues; From: Mr. Conny Kullman, INTELSAT Chief Executive & Director 
General; To: All Parties, Signatories, And Members Of The Board Of Governors INTELSAT; 17 November 1999: 
available at http://www.intelsat.com/news/policy/pletter17nov.htm (accessed 20 December 2000). 
121 Open-market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act, S. 376, 106th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). 
122 Ibid, s. 603: Restrictions Pending Privatization. The restrictions related to the prohibition on providing 
services in the U.S. market to carriers other than COMSAT, and required that, in case INTELSAT failed to privatize 
itself by 1 January 2002, (i) preference must be given to commercial private sector providers of space segment, 





unilateral action of the U.S. Congress imposed on a 143-member intergovernmental 
organization.123
Francis Lyall correctly pointed out that the privatization of INTELSAT, especially the 
way it has been achieved, was “an unwelcome development and indeed arguably contrary to 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty” as well as UNGA Resolution 1721 (D).124 Now the 
privatized INTELSAT is under no legal obligation to provide non-discriminatory universal 
access to its services and could be used to promote particular national policies, including the 
imposition of sanctions against certain counties and denial of services to them. More 
importantly, like any other private business, it should be expected to maximize its profits, which 
might tempt it not to serve unprofitable areas and routes.  
From the adoption of the ORBIT Act, it was clear that the U.S. had effectively controlled 
the privatization of INTELSAT. Competitive access to and privatized ownership of global 
satellite communications were actually happening at the national level as member States were 
allowing their private telecommunication operators to participate in INTELSAT and thus were 
replacing their public entities as the shareholders of this international organization. Ironically, in 
1999 the U.S. became only the 95th State to introduce competition in access to INTELSAT when 
it allowed its several private telecommunications companies to have direct access to the 
INTELSAT system instead of requiring them to go through COMSAT, a private U.S. firm that 
monopolized U.S. access since the inception of INTELSAT in 1963.125 Therefore, one wonders 
if the real intention of the U.S. was to introduce competition and privatization or to dismantle an 
international public institution so that it could effectively exercise control over it and thus expand 
its economic philosophy internationally. The American ORBIT Act compromised global public 
interest and might possibly have adverse economic implications for a large number of States, 
especially developing countries, depriving them of access to satellite telecommunications on a 
non-discriminatory and universal basis.  
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“Safeguarding the Concept of Public Service and the Global Public Interest in Telecommunications,” 5(1) Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2001, pp 71 et seq. 
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2.2.2. Access to radio frequencies and orbital positions 
All satellites use radio frequencies to communicate with Earth stations. The other 
essential tool for satellite telecommunications is the orbit in which a satellite is placed. There are 
several orbits from where a satellite can operate. The geostationary orbit (GEO) is the most 
preferred and used orbit. The 24-hour ‘visibility’ of a satellite in GEO makes it uniquely 
advantageous for telecommunications and certain other services. Other orbits, such as Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), have been used for telecommunication satellite 
constellations, reconnaissance, early warning, science, and other purposes. However, both the 
radio frequencies and GEO positions are international natural resources and limited in 
availability. 
Access to the most appropriate radio frequencies and orbital locations in outer space is 
essentially based on a first-come, first-served practice, which has been a major concern to a large 
number of countries, especially in the third world. Countries such as India and Indonesia, the 
first of the developing countries that attempted to use GEO, faced undue difficulties in securing 
access for their earlier satellites. The legal principles and rules that regulate access to and use of 
radio frequencies and orbital positions have been adopted through international conferences 
organized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the oldest specialized agency of 
the UN. Article 44 (2) of the ITU Constitution recognizes that radio frequencies and orbital 
positions are limited international resources, and imposes an obligation on ITU member States to 
use them efficiently and economically in order to ensure equitable access by all countries. 126 
While no definition of “equitable access” is found in the ITU Constitution, some of the 
provisions make the meaning of this term clear: (a) the special needs of the developing countries 
and the geographical situation of particular countries must be taken into account while making 
use of the radio frequencies and orbital positions, and (b) countries may have equitable access 
only in conformity with the ITU Radio Regulations. Since modifying these Regulations is a long 
                                                 
126 Article 44 (2) of the ITU Constitution provides that: “In using frequency bands for radio services, Member 
States shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, 
are limited natural resources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently and economically, in conformity with 
the provisions of the Radio Regulations, so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to those 
orbits and frequencies, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and the geographical 
situation of particular countries.” It should be noted that the 1998 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference has amended this 
Article in order to emphasize that it is not only the geostationary orbit but all other orbits around the Earth that are a 




and tedious process, equitable access has been effected, so far, only to a limited extent and 
through two allotment plans for (a) the Broadcasting Satellite Service operating in 12 GHz band 
and associated feeder links, and (b) the Fixed Satellite Service operating in 6/4 GHz and 14/11 
GHz bands. The rarity of such plans can be attributed to the unwillingness of some powerful 
member States of ITU to accept restrictions on their freedom of action in the use of radio 
frequencies and orbital positions. Consequently, the practice of first-come, first-served continues 
to apply to all frequency bands for satellite telecommunication services, except those mentioned 
above.  
A serious problem in access to radio frequencies and orbital positions has arisen, 
particularly with respect to the geostationary orbit, not only because the GEO is limited, but also 
because several countries, mainly the developed ones, started registering so-called ‘paper 
satellites’ with the ITU. According to an ITU paper titled Paper Tigers: The Scramble for Space 
Spectrum, some States reserve orbital “positions and frequency bands for possible future use, or 
for commercial resale to another user at a later date.”127 In 1998, INTELSAT presented the data 
about the most used C and Ku bands according to which INTELSAT had registered 25 slots but 
was actually using only 19. Similarly, the number for the U.S. was 74 registered and 36 actually 
occupied slots, and Russia had registered 58 orbital positions when it using only 25.  In view of 
such an apparent practice of hoarding orbital positions and radio frequencies, INTELSAT 
announced its intention of “deregistering” eight orbital slot registrations with the ITU in order to 
“set an example [for] efficient use of scarce orbital resources.”128 These slots had been registered 
by INTELSAT and never used. Although INTELSAT claimed this was motivated by an effort to 
improve orbit utilization, the reactions from outsiders were quite different. For example, an 
American private satellite company, PamAmSat, declared that the returned slots were anyway 
completely unusable.129
It should be noted that it is not the actual satellite in orbit but early registration of that 
satellite with the ITU that blocks the placing of other satellites in the same location in the GEO. 
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The “paper satellite” problem has been real and wide spread.130 According to ITU, in 2002 the 
backlog of satellite systems awaiting full registration stood at around 1200 when ITU was 
regularly receiving between 400-500 requests for new systems each year, only around one tenth 
of which would ever be launched.131
In order to address the problem of paper satellites, the ITU has recently adopted several 
legal rules and procedures governing the use of radio frequencies and geostationary orbital 
positions. In brief, these rules and procedures relate to: (a) the limitation of time for bringing into 
use the satellite systems registered with the ITU; (b) the imposition of administrative due 
diligence procedures for notification to ITU; (c) the possibility of cancellation of the registered 
satellite positions if not used within the allowed time period; and (d) the charging of registration 
application processing fees. These rules could possibly lead to a more efficient use of radio 
frequencies and orbital positions so that all countries would have equitable access to these 
important resources. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of these measures, but it has 
recently been reported132 that almost all States owing money to the ITU for satellite filings have 
not paid significant portions of their dues.133 Though the non-payment of dues would not result 
in the loss of orbital slots, this shows that the ITU doesn’t have any enforcement powers and 
consequently that the new rules are unlikely to have much effect in practice. 
Access to outer space for telecommunication purposes can be enhanced by guaranteeing 
the ready availability of appropriate radio frequencies and orbital positions to all States. 
However, a large majority of countries would not have sufficient resources to launch their own 
satellites and perhaps would not need to do so either. Therefore, it is important that participation 
in internationally operating satellite systems should be encouraged. In other words, it would be in 
the global public interest that an inter-governmental global organization, preferably modeled on 
the original INMARSAT or INTELSAT system, with financial participation by private entities 
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of all States, should be created to provide telecommunications services to all countries on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
2.3. Satellite remote sensing134 
The international legal principles that specifically govern remote sensing satellites and 
access to satellite imagery were discussed for about fifteen years in the Legal Subcommittee of 
the COPUOS. Two opposing views collided: one was presented by States, such as U.S. and some 
other developed countries, that advocated unrestricted use of satellites for remote sensing and 
freedom of distribution of satellite imagery. The other view, advanced by developing, socialist 
and some developed countries, stressed that the acquisition and distribution of the satellite 
imagery must be governed by the principle of State sovereignty. Thus, they advocated prior 
consent of the sensed State for the acquisition and distribution of satellite imagery of its 
respective territory. 
A compromise was achieved in 1986 when the UN General Assembly adopted 
unanimously a Resolution containing the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space.135 Under this compromise,136 concerned countries gave up their demand for 
prior consent in exchange for the recognition of the right of the sensed State to have access, “on 
a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms,” to the primary data137 and the 
processed data138 concerning its territory. The sensed State has also been entitled to have access 
                                                 
134 For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Jakhu, Ram, “International Law Regarding the Acquisition and 
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135 UN General Assembly Resolution 41/65, adopted without vote on 3 December 1986.  
136 Ibid. Principle XII of the Resolution provides that: “As soon as the primary data and the processed data 
concerning the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the sensed State shall have access to them on a non-
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137 Ibid, Principle I; the term “primary data” means “the raw data that are acquired by remote sensors borne by a 
space object and that are transmitted or delivered to the ground from space by telemetry in the form of 
electromagnetic signals, by photographic film, magnetic tape or any other means.” 
138 Ibid; the term “processed data” means “the products resulting from the processing of the primary data, needed 




to the available analyzed information139 concerning its territory. Thus the Resolution clearly 
establishes a fair balance of interests of all States.140  
Principle XII of the Resolution, with its mandatory wording (e.g. ‘shall have access’), 
clearly recognizes the legal right of the sensed State to seek from the sensing State satellite 
imagery of its own territory. The Resolution, particularly its Principle XII on non-discriminatory 
access, has often been cited by various States as an authoritative legal principle applicable to 
their satellite imagery acquisition and distribution policies. Therefore, it is expected of the 
sensing State(s) to positively respond to the requests by the sensed States for satellite imagery of 
their respective territories.141 A denial of such a request would be considered contrary to the 
provisions of the 1986 Resolution, particularly its Principle XII. 
Unfortunately, several States have recently started applying their own national laws and 
policies in ways that could restrict access in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Ironically, the 
United States, which has always ardently advocated the freedom of acquisition and non-
discriminatory dissemination of satellite imagery, became the first State to impose complex and 
extensive legal prohibitions on the collection and distribution of such imagery. 
The U.S. Regulations Relating to the Licensing of Private Land Remote-Sensing Space 
Systems142 prescribe requirements for the licensing, monitoring and compliance of operators of 
private Earth remote sensing satellite systems. Under these Regulations, a licensee could be 
required by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to limit data collection or distribution as determined 
to be necessary to meet national security or foreign policy concerns or international obligations 
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of the United States. In addition, a licensee is obliged to make available to any sensed Stated 
only unenhanced data143 and that too can be restricted subject to the “U.S. national security 
concerns, foreign policy or international obligations” or to the American laws that prohibit 
transactions with the sensed State.144 The terms ‘national security’ and ‘foreign policy concerns’ 
are nowhere defined in the Regulations and thus can be used arbitrarily. On the basis of these 
restrictions, the U.S. may at will deny a sensed State the satellite imagery of its territory. More 
importantly, under these Regulations, a license is required by a person subject to the jurisdiction 
or control of the United States who operates or proposes to operate a private remote sensing 
satellite system, either directly or through an affiliate or subsidiary.145 The phrase ‘person subject 
to the jurisdiction or control of the United States’ has been defined very broadly and can include 
foreign entities that, for example, use a U.S. launch vehicle or platform; operate a spacecraft 
command or data acquisition or ground remote station in the United States; and process the data 
at or market it from facilities within the United States.146 Each licensee is required to comply 
with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, these Regulations and the conditions of his 
license. It is believed that, in practice, the U.S. Regulations will have extraterritorial application 
with respect to the collection or distribution of satellite imagery by all foreign operators (e.g., the 
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Canadian RADARSAT system)147 and satellite imagery distributors that have any link with the 
U.S. 
Influenced by the U.S. example, other countries could also be expected (or ‘encouraged’ 
or ‘lured’ or ‘forced’) to follow a similar approach in the future. Canada has already decided to 
develop national controls on the collection and distribution of satellite imagery.148 In November 
2004, the Government of Canada introduced new draft legislation (Bill C-25) in Parliament on 
this issue.149 If passed, the new law would enable the collection, processing, and distribution of 
high-resolution satellite data, but always subject to Canadian domestic policies, security, and 
foreign affairs interests. 
Any unilateral application of arbitrary restrictions on the collection and distribution of 
remote sensing data purely on the basis of exclusive national interests (a) is contrary to the 
principles of the 1986 UN Resolution on Remote Sensing, (b) seriously impedes non-
discriminatory access to any satellite imagery even for peaceful civilian and commercial 
purposes and peace-keeping missions, and (c) consequently goes against the global public 
interest in outer space. Moreover, because of a close affinity between the civilian uses of remote 
sensing satellites and military reconnaissance, 150 there is a strong possibility that these satellites 
                                                 
 
147 See Bates, supra note 79. 
148 The Canadian Ministers for Defense and Foreign Affairs have jointly issued a policy statement according to 
which Canada will develop new legislation to control commercial remote sensing satellites. The following is one of 
the several principles that will guide the Canadian Government in the drafting and adoption of the law to regulate 
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(House of Commons) Bill C-25: “An Act governing the operation of remote sensing space systems”: “This 
enactment regulates remote sensing space systems to ensure that their operation is neither injurious to national 
security, to the defense of Canada, to the safety of Canadian Forces or to Canada’s conduct of international relations 
nor inconsistent with Canada’s international obligations. In order to accomplish this, the enactment establishes a 
licensing regime for remote sensing space systems and provides for restrictions on the distribution of data gathered 
by means of them. In addition, the enactment gives special powers to the Government of Canada concerning priority 
access to remote sensing services and the interruption of such services.” 
150 In his article “Moving towards a Transparent Battlespace,” General Richard B. Myers wrote: “The 
proliferation of near real-time, militarily significant imagery is a major concern for us, a concern that would have to 




could become the first targets for anti-satellite strikes not only during actual war or crisis but also 
in anticipation of hostilities. Therefore, it is suggested that an international legally binding 
agreement supplementing the UN Resolution on Remote Sensing be concluded in order (i) to 
ensure the ready and non-discriminatory access to satellite imagery in all forms for civilian, 
commercial, and peace-keeping purposes, and (ii) to prohibit the use of any force against all 
remote sensing satellites that are operating in accordance with international law. 
2.4. Satellite navigation services 
Navigational satellites are invaluable tools for both military and civilian uses, particularly 
in transportation, telecommunications, agriculture, and disaster management. Satellite-based 
navigation systems are becoming an important economic space application. According to a 
European Union document, “demand for satellite navigation services and derived products 
around the world is growing at a rapid 25% a year and could reach €275 [billion] by 2020, in the 
process creating 100,000 skilled jobs.”151
The American Government operates a navigational satellite system known as the Global 
Positioning System (GPS), owned and controlled by its military establishment. Similarly, Russia 
operates its GLONASS system, which was also designed for military purposes. Both these 
countries have allowed their systems to be used free of charge for civilian purposes but their 
respective armed forces retain exclusive control over them.152 Because of the technological 
superiority and marketing capability of the U.S., GPS is being used for various civilian 
applications globally. In order not to depend upon GPS or GLONASS, the European 
Commission proposed in February 1999 the creation of a European independent satellite-based 
navigation system, known as Galileo, to be operated for civilian and commercial purposes. 
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From the outset, the U.S. has opposed the creation of Galileo, insisting that this system 
will pose a threat to its national security, could interfere with military uses of GPS, and would be 
an unnecessary duplication of GPS.153 The U.S. also opposed in the International 
Telecommunication Union the use of certain radio frequencies by the Galileo system. In fact, the 
U.S. opposition was so intense and persistent that in 2002 the spokesperson for Galileo “declared 
that under the strain of American pressure, ‘Galileo is almost dead.’”154 The underlining reasons 
for the American hostility toward Galileo, according to several individuals, were the loss of 
American monopoly on satellite navigation and the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars that its 
companies earn by selling the GPS-related receivers to users around the world.155  
After four years of intense negotiations between the EU and the U.S., an agreement on 
major issues, including interoperability of both the systems, was reached in February 2004.156 
The agreement became possible only when “the Europeans agreed to change the modulation of 
Galileo signals intended for government use so they would not disrupt encrypted GPS signals to 
be used by the US military and NATO.”157 According to Loyola de Palacio, the European 
Commission Vice President, “[t]his agreement will allow all users to use both systems in a 
complementary way with the same receiver. ... It recognizes both sides as equal partners and 
creates the optimal conditions for the development of the European system, fully independent 
and compatible and redundant to the American GPS.”158 Although several legal and procedural 
issues related to national security remain to be addressed, it is important to note that this 
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agreement allows non-discriminatory access by all as required by the WTO rules related to trade 
in satellite navigation goods and services. In other words, Galileo will be an independent and 
open system to be used by all interested States for civilian and commercial purposes.  
The European States have managed to take decisive and important policy decisions that 
will have significant implications for global space exploration and use. The Galileo system will 
not only benefit 450 million people in Europe, but will also serve a global market. Perhaps a 
more important decision of the European States is to open this system not only for use but also 
for financial (and possibly managerial) participation by other States. The world’s two most 
populated nations, China and India, have already committed to invest €200 million and €300 
million respectively.159 Canada as well as Israel (with its €20-50 million) will also participate in 
the system.160 The Russians have agreed to launch the first two Galileo experimental satellites.161 
Such wide international participation cannot be expected either from the American GPS or 
Russian GLONASS systems because of their ownership and control by their respective military 
establishments, whose primary responsibilities are to actively support the strategic positions of 
their governments.162
The Galileo system, which will consist of 30 satellites, will become operational in 2008 
at a cost of approximately €3.5 billion. This joint undertaking of the European Union and the 
ESA will also be jointly owned by the public and private sectors and managed by a civilian body. 
Financial participation by countries like China and India and eventual use of the Galileo by 
                                                 
159 See, “Europe Helps China Setup Satellite Navigation Center,” Paris. 19 September 2003, available at 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/gps-03x.html (accessed23 September 2003); “China signs agreement with EU on 
Galileo project,” Beijing, 30 October 2003, available at http://www.spacedaily.com/2003/ 
031030124730.ppien2mq.html (accessed 04 May 2004); “China Tests European Satellite Positioning System” 
Beijing, 19 January 2004, available at http://www.spacedaily.com/news/gps-04f.html (accessed 23 January 2004); 
“India to Invest in Galileo satellite project: EU,” Brussels, 30 October 2003, available at 
http://www.spacedaily.com/2003/031030141843.79tqo71o.html (accessed 04 May 2004). 
160 “Israel signs up to European satellite project,” Brussels, 17 March 2004, available at 
http://www.spacedaily.com/2004/040317190214.phid3q06.html (21 May 2004). Also “EU and Israel GALILEO 
agreement,” 22 March 2004, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ space/articles/news/news109_en.html 
(accessed 21 May 2004). 
161 “Russians To Launch First Two Of EU’s Galileo GPS Satellites,” Paris, 3 March 2004, available at 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/gps-04v.html (accessed 22 May 2004). 
162 According to a U.S. Air Force Document, “The United States could attack Europe’s planned network of 
global positioning satellites if it was used by a hostile power such as China”: see “US Could Shoot Down Euro GPS 
Satellites If Used By China In Wartime: Report,” London (AFP) 24 October 2004, available at 




hundreds of millions of their citizens could undoubtedly make the system financially viable and 
self-sustaining. 
Galileo could serve as a precedent for further expansion of economic and eventual 
political ties with other States. One can see the emergence of a multi-polar world (to 
counterbalance the hegemony of a single superpower). China is already considered a “strategic 
partner” of the European Union as bilateral trade between them has grown to €134.8 billion a 
year, and they “now have become each other’s second largest trading partners.”163 Important 
implications of this initiative of the European States will be to enhance development of space 
science and industrial capability in Europe, to provide civilian and commercial satellite 
navigation services on a world-wide basis, and to implement global public interest in outer space.  
2.5. Military uses and weaponization of space 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty deals with certain military uses of outer space and 
celestial bodies.164 The Article contains a specific prohibition against “placing in orbit around the 
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” 
The Article does not, however, prohibit the military use of outer space per se. Neither does it ban 
anti-satellite (ASAT) or space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, provided they do 
not carry ‘nuclear weapons’ or ‘weapons of mass destruction.’ 
The United States and the Soviet Union have historically relied exclusively on Article IV 
of the Outer Space Treaty to determine the legality of space weapons and to argue that ASAT 
and BMD are lawful. The interpretation of Article IV has essentially centered on the meaning of 
the term ‘peaceful uses’ as employed in the Treaty. For a long time, there had been two schools 
of thought on this issue: the Soviet Union insisted that ‘peaceful’ means ‘non-military,’ while the 
U.S. maintained that the term should be understood to include ‘civilian’ and ‘military non-
                                                 
163 See, “China, EU Developing ‘Mature Partnership’,” Brussels, 05 May 2004, available at 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-04zb.html (accessed 28 May 2004). 
164 Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides that: “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install 
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The Moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment 
of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military 
maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful 




aggressive.’ Eventually, the U.S. view prevailed de facto and the controversy ended, at least in 
regards to the types of space-based military support activities that were prevalent at the time.165
One may see China’s current position as puzzling. On the one hand, the Chinese believe 
that the Outer Space Treaty has a “loophole” such that anything not explicitly prohibited by 
Article IV is seemed to be permitted; therefore, a new agreement is needed. On the other hand, 
China asserts that expanded military uses of outer space are inconsistent with the principles of 
the Treaty and thus could be declared illegal since the principles are embedded in the operative 
text.166 In fact, there is no inconsistency in these two statements. As discussed below,167 Article 
IV was actually designed to be limited in its coverage of nuclear weapons and other WMD in 
outer space and thus its lacunae need to be filled by a new agreement to supplement the Outer 
Space Treaty. At the same time the object of the Treaty has been to assure peaceful uses of outer 
space for the benefit of all and extreme militarization that would damage the peaceful utilization 
of outer space is contrary to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. 
The legality of excessive militarization and space weapons must not be determined 
exclusively on the application and interpretation of a single provision in Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty. All provisions must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions, the 
Preamble of the Treaty, and its negotiation and ratification history.168 Ambassador Arthur 
Goldberg, who had participated on behalf of the U.S. in the negotiation of the Treaty in 
                                                 
165 According to the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission Report: “The U.S. and most other nations interpret ‘peaceful’ 
to mean ‘non-aggressive’; this comports with customary international law allowing for routine military activities in 
outer space, as it does on the high seas and in international airspace”: Executive Summary, Report of the 
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (chaired by Donald H. 
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absurdly — that all nuclear and chemical weapons are also ‘peaceful; as long as they are not used for aggressive 
purpose.” Ivan Vlasic, “The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Bhupendra 
Jasani (ed), Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, 
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 1991), p. 37, at p. 45. 
166 “China Says It Opposes Militarization Of Outer Space,” Beijing (AFP) May 19, 2005; available at 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-05za.html (accessed 20 May 2005): on 19 May 2005, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stated: “Space is our shared treasure and we have consistently maintained 
the need for the peaceful use of space so as to benefit all of mankind. ... We are opposed to the militarization of 
outer space. We support preventive measures, including the adoption of international legal documents to guarantee 
the peaceful use of outer space.” Also see “China Calls For Preventing Outer Space Arms Race,” Geneva (XNA) 27 
August 2004, available at http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-04zzb.html (accessed 11 September 2004); UN 
Press Release, China accepts “Five Ambassadors” Proposal on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space as 
amended, 07.08.03, available at http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/ newsen/dc0333e.htm (accessed 11 
September 2004). 
167 See below subsection 3.4 of this paper. 




COPUOS, in his testimony before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
Outer Space Treaty, had pointed out that “any document must be read in its entirety, and you 
must take article I and read it in reference to articles II, III, IV, the whole Treaty. You cannot 
isolate one section and read it in isolation, and when you read it as a whole, you get the meaning 
of the Treaty.”169 In his written statement to the Senate, Ambassador Goldberg, referring to 
Article IV, also said that, “Surely it is much better and definitely easier to close the door to the 
arms race before it enters a new dimension, than to attempt to root it out once it has become 
established.”170 When welcoming the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, then-U.S. 
President Lyndon Johnson hailed the Treaty as “the most important arms control development 
since the limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.”171 Similarly, when submitting the Treaty to the U.S. 
Senate, for its advice and consent, President Johnson asserted that, now, “No one may use outer 
space or celestial bodies to begin war.”172
The deployment, and not to mention use, of space weapons of any kind, would in all 
likelihood lead to an arms race in outer space and thus would be contrary (a) to Article III of the 
Outer Space Treaty as such an arms race would threaten international peace and security as well 
as international cooperation;173 (b) to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty as a whole, even 
though not specifically the provisions of Article IV; and (c) consequently to the global public 
interest in outer space.  
                                                 
169 Cited in The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Analysis and Background Data, Staff Report, prepared for 
the Use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, March 1967. (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 33. 
170 “Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, on 
the Outer Space Treaty,” in Hearings before the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth 
Congress, First Session on Executive D, 90th Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1967), p.148. 
171 Cited in The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Analysis and Background Data, Staff Report, prepared for 
the Use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, March 1967. (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16. 
172 “Letter of Transmittal to the Senate of the United States by President Lyndon Johnson,” Hearings before the 
Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session on Executive D, 90th 
Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p.105, at p.107. 
173 Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, provides that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international 
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and 




There is clear evidence that shows strong international support for such a broad 
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.  In a series of UN General Assembly resolutions, most 
recently in 2004, member States of the international community overwhelmingly reaffirmed the 
provisions of Articles III and IV of the Treaty and urged all States to strive prevent an arms race 
in outer space, to maintain international peace and security and to promote international 
cooperation.174 As at this time there may not be any weapons in outer space, the international 
community, through the UN, should urgently take action to prevent a weapons race in outer 
space. (For more discussion of this issue, see below subsection 3.4 of this paper). 
3. Future Legal Regime for Space Governance 
As noted above, starting in 1958 the UN General Assembly through COPUOS initially 
addressed all matters related to outer space. When the subject of excessive militarization of space 
surfaced in the mid 1970s, several States started expressing their concerns. On the insistence of 
some States, particularly the major space powers, the forum for discussion of military uses then 
became the Conference on Disarmament (CD) because of the close affinity between general 
arms controls efforts and the utilization of outer space for military purposes. Since progress 
continues to be stalemated in the CD on any significant arms control matters, it also remains 
dormant on outer space issues. It is disheartening to note that while the UNGA keeps calling for 
action on this matter, the CD remains deadlocked and the COPUOS is not ‘allowed’ to deliberate 
this issue because some States, especially the some major space powers, believe that this body 
should only address non-military space issues. In any discussion about the legal regime for future 
space governance it is imperative to assess the law-making process and the forum (or fora) that 
could be conducive to making the necessary progress. 
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3.1. International space law-making process 
The Outer Space Treaty was negotiated through the United Nations, the sole political and 
representative body of the whole international community. Although not specifically provided in 
its Charter, the UN has been generally considered to have the proper competence to consider 
legal issues arising from all outer space activities. From the very advent of space age, the UN 
General Assembly has assumed responsibility for all outer space matters and discharges it 
primarily through its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
The COPUOS was first established in 1958 as an ad hoc Committee with eighteen 
member States. A year later it was reestablished as a permanent body and its membership has 
since been increased periodically to the present number of sixty-seven.175 The membership of 
COPUOS is based on the principle of equitable representation of developed and developing 
countries, space powers and non-space powers, and from all the regions of the world. The 
COPUOS functions through its two Subcommittees, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
and the Legal Subcommittee. The Legal Subcommittee drafts treaties and agreements regarding 
outer space and presents them to the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in turn, adopts 
them as resolutions and recommends them for signature and ratification by its member States.176
Both the COPUOS and its Subcommittees make decisions on the basis of an informal 
rule of consensus. In practice, the process of law-making has largely been geared to the desires 
of the former Soviet Union and the United States. Despite the influential presence of the super-
powers in COPUOS, other States have played a part in the formulation of the international space 
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Resolution A/RES/57/116 of 2003 on “International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space” adopted 
without a vote. Libya and Thailand were added by Res. 59/116 Paragraph 44 of 25 Jan 2005. 
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regime, but their views could not prevail, nor could the superpowers gain everything they 
wanted, without the consent of other member States of the COPUOS.177
The consensus rule was adopted in 1962 in order to satisfy the concerns of certain States 
particularly the Soviet bloc countries, which feared their views might be ignored when important 
decisions would be made by vote.178 Adoption of the consensus rule ensured that the decision-
making process in the COPOUS would be fair to all member States. 
The consensus rule worked relatively well in the past, as five treaties and three 
resolutions on major space law issues were successfully drafted and adopted, the only exception 
being the 1982 Resolution on the Direct Television Broadcasting via Satellite, which was drafted 
by the COPUOS and adopted through a UNGA resolution by a majority vote.179 However, in 
recent years the rule has become controversial. The increase in membership of the COPUOS 
seems to have made the process of law-making more difficult. It is said that this rule (i) retards 
reaching decisions; (ii) results in the adoption of vague (compromised) wording in the text of 
treaties and resolutions; and (iii) prevents important issues being placed on the agenda of the 
Legal Subcommittee. Since the adoption of the Moon Agreement in 1979,180 not a single new 
space law treaty has been drafted by the Legal Subcommittee. Several important items have been 
proposed for inclusion in its agenda, but to no avail. These items related to: (i) commercial 
aspects of space activities (intellectual property, insurance and liability); (ii) legal control of 
space debris; (iii) comparative review of international space law and international environmental 
law; (iv) improvements in the Registration Convention; (v) militarization and weaponization of 
outer space; and (vi) the drafting of a single comprehensive space treaty. All these issues are 
important to all States (both space and non-space powers) but have not been accepted for 
discussion in the Legal Subcommittee. On the other hand, the COPUOS agreed in 2001 to add to 
the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee an item relating to the Draft Convention of Unidroit on 
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International Interests in Mobile Equipment181 — an issue important only to a limited number of 
States. According to some States that participated in the IV Space Conference of the Americas 
(in Cartagena, Colombia, 14-17 May 2002), the law-making process in the Legal Subcommittee 
has reached a stage of serious crisis. A very small minority of powerful States is monopolizing 
decision-making in COPUOS using the requirement of consensus as a veto power. The current 
rule of decision-making in COPUOS clearly needs to be changed to make the Committee more 
efficient and effective in its international space law-making efforts. 
It is also disheartening to note that since 1979 the COPUOS has avoided the drafting of 
binding agreements and preferred to adopt non-binding resolutions. This approach is favored by 
some States on the grounds that it is easier to agree upon resolutions than on binding treaties. 
However, as we have seen in the cases of the 1961 Resolution on Satellite 
Telecommunications182 and the 1986 Resolution on Remote Sensing,183 some States do not 
hesitate to adopt national regulations or take other actions that are contrary to the provisions of 
these Resolutions.  
In this regard, a recent development in negotiating an important treaty may be noted. 
When the negotiations of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention184 were failing, Canada 
challenged the international community to negotiate in earnest and sign a treaty by December 
1997. This initiative, which became known as the ‘Ottawa Process,’ included a strong 
commitment by the like-minded States to proceed with the negotiations and not to be 
discouraged by the fact that major States, especially the U.S. and the Russian Federation, were 
not interested in participating in the negotiation. Today, irrespective of the fact that the U.S. and 
the Russian Federation are not parties to the Landmines Convention, this treaty is considered be 
a great success as over 145 States have signed or ratified it.185 Influenced by strong support for 
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on their Destruction, signed on 3-4 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada; available at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/law/xxvi-22.htm (accessed 15 March 2005). 
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as of 20 December 2004; available at http://www.mines.gc.ca/convention-en.asp (accessed 23 February 2005). 
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this the Convention, several non-signatory States have recently declared their unilateral 
moratoriums on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel mines. Admitting 
that the issues related to landmines and outer space activities are not similar, perhaps, the 
precedent of ‘Ottawa Process’ could be used to deal with some specific and urgent space-related 
issues.186
3.2. Boundary between air space and outer space 
The question of the boundary between air space and outer space is one of the oldest still-
unresolved items on the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.187 While a majority of 
countries insist on the necessity of establishing such a boundary, several industrial States, led by 
the U.S. and a few of its allies, strongly object, claiming that the absence of a demarcation 
between air space and outer space has caused no problems up to now. The proponents of 
establishing a boundary line point out that since the legal regimes that govern air space and outer 
space are utterly dissimilar, clear demarcation is necessary. One advocate of this view stressed in 
the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS that “definition and delimitation of outer space [are] 
indispensable for member States to have a legal basis on which to regulate their national 
territories and to resolve issues arising from collisions that could occur between aerospace 
objects and aircraft.”188
A similar problem in the Law of the Sea was resolved in the 1960s when a boundary was 
established between the territorial sea and the high seas. This occurred after a number of States 
began unilaterally extending the breadth of their territorial sea to twelve miles, a practice that 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
success of the ban movement.”: Jody Williams, 1997 Nobel Laureate for Peace, speaking about Canada’s challenge 
to negotiate a treaty against anti-personnel landmines in one year; available at http://www.mines.gc.ca/II/II_B-
en.asp (accessed 23 February 2005).  
186 For details, see Johnson, Rebecca, “Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponization of Space,” 
Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue no. 56 (April 2001), available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/ dd56/56rej.htm 
(accessed 30 July 2005).  
187 One of the items on the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee is: “Matters relating to: (a) The definition and 
delimitation of outer space; (b) The character and utilization of the geostationary orbit, including consideration of 
ways and means to ensure the rational and equitable use of the geostationary orbit without prejudice to the role of 
the International Telecommunication Union.” 




eventually was formalized in the Law of the Sea Convention.189 National initiatives might also 
provide the impetus for international agreement on a clear air space–outer space demarcation 
line. For example, Australia’s 1998 Space Activities Act,190 which governs all launches above 
100 kilometers, seems to recognize that outer space begins at the altitude of 100 kilometers. The 
Australian view on the height of the air space is similar to what the Soviet Union had proposed at 
the 1979 Session of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS (and reiterated in 1983): “The 
boundary between outer space and air space shall be established by agreement among States at 
an altitude not exceeding 110 kilometers above the sea level, and shall be legally confirmed by 
the conclusion of an international legal instrument of a binding character.”191 In this context it is 
also interesting to note that the recent launch of the first privately funded aerospace vehicle, 
SpaceShipOne, which ‘flew’ up to an altitude of 100 km (62 miles), underscored the fact that 
outer space possibly begins at the height of 100 km above the Earth.192
3.3. Space debris 
At present, only about 6 to 7 percent of the 8,000 to 9,000 regularly tracked man-made 
space objects are operating satellites, whereas the rest, 94 to 93 percent, are space debris.193 
                                                 
 
189 Article 3, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (and the Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of the Convention), signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 1982, Entered into 
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193 For details on space debris, see Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem, October 1990, OTA-BP-
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There have been several recorded close encounters with space debris and one confirmed 
collision, in which the spent third stage of Ariane Flight 16 collided with and destroyed the 
French military micro-satellite CERISE on 24 July 1996.194 Due to rapidly increasing space 
debris, the use of outer space is steadily becoming even more dangerous and expensive. Several 
studies conducted by various experts and organizations as well as the views expressed in the 
COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee show that the problem of space debris is 
serious.195 Such debris not only pose a threat to active satellites in the orbit but could also cause 
damage on the surface of the Earth if they fall back to Earth. For example, the Soviet satellite 
COSMOS 954 disintegrated in 1978 and scattered radioactive debris over a large area in 
Northern Canada.196
The rationale for legal controls of space debris lies in the strong possibility of serious 
damage to operating spacecraft as the amount of debris is increasing rapidly. A collision of a 
piece of space debris with an active military satellite, such as the CERISE accident, during a 
period of high tension could have very serious implications between the concerned States. To 
control and reduce these hazards, the major users of space should take the initiative as their 
activities and assets in space are at higher risk. Non-space powers should also be concerned; 
being the latecomers in the use of outer space, they would bear the heavier risks, particularly 
because of the presence of space debris in the geostationary orbit. In that orbit, the possibility of 
physical collisions between space debris and active satellites is becoming serious, even though a 
large majority of countries do not yet have a single satellite in that orbit. 
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A few States, including the U.S., have already started to the implement modest national 
space debris reduction policies.197 The space agencies of Canada, China, Europe, India, Russia, 
and the U.S. have also been consulting with each other on this issue through an informal group 
called the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) and have adopted 
voluntary guidelines for mitigation of space debris production.198 Such initiatives are useful in 
the short term, but the effectiveness of national and even plurilateral regulatory initiatives would 
be limited since a single major accident could create hazards for space activities of all States. At 
the UN, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the COPUOS has been discussing the 
issue of space debris since 1994. Even after a decade of deliberations, the Subcommittee did not 
achieve anything concrete except to agree “that member States, in particular space-faring 
countries, should pay more attention to the problem of collision of space objects, including those 
with nuclear power sources on board, with space debris and to other aspects of space debris, as 
well as its reentry into the atmosphere.”199 Several States expressed the desire to endorse the 
IADC voluntary guidelines but no decision was taken. Such reluctance on the part of States, 
especially the major space-faring-nations, in the adoption of international legal rules (or even 
voluntary guidelines) to regulate space debris could be only due to the fact that they have not 
been willing to accept any legal controls on their freedom of action.  
Since the issue of space debris is not currently being addressed by the Legal 
Subcommittee of the COPUOS, it is suggested that this item be placed on the agenda of the 
Subcommittee with a view to drafting regulations to control this threat. However, as a starting 
point the Legal Subcommittee should basically endorse the guidelines that have already been 
drafted by the IADC and later develop binding regulations. Uncontrolled growth of space debris 
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can seriously harm and restrict future use of outer space and thus is contrary to the global public 
interest in outer space. 
3.4. Space militarization and weaponization 
Military satellites enhance the potential of virtually all weapons systems. Early warning, 
meteorological, and navigation satellite systems provide efficient and reliable assistance to 
modern weapons systems. The importance of satellites for military operations in war was for the 
first time convincingly demonstrated during the Gulf War in 1991.200
During the 1980s and 90s, extensive technological efforts and advances were made in the 
development of weapons to be used in, to, and from space to attack satellites in orbit, missiles 
and warheads in transit through space, and objects on the surface of the Earth. Interest in the 
development of space weapons has been increasing with (i) the growing dependence on space 
assets for the operation of armed forces and terrestrial weapons, and (ii) the adoption of new 
aggressive military doctrines. 
The weaponization of space can take on a variety of forms: first, there are space strike or 
orbital bombardment weapon systems. Second, there are anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems, 
the sole purpose of which is to degrade, damage, or destroy other satellites. Any country that can 
launch a satellite into orbit could have at least a rudimentary capability to destroy other satellites, 
due to the high velocities encountered in orbit and the inherent fragility of satellites. Finally, 
there are ballistic missile defense (BMD) weapon systems. “Some variants of BMD systems may 
be based in outer space and be used to destroy incoming ballistic missiles through the boost and 
mid-course phases of their flight. Putative weapons, such as orbiting space-based lasers based on 
‘exotic’ technologies or variants of conventionally armed and kinetic energy ‘kill-mechanism’ 
missile interceptors may be capable of performing all three functions.”201
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Recently, dramatic changes have occurred in the military space doctrine of the U.S., 
which now includes (i) striving to achieve space control and dominance, and (ii) the ability to 
deny the use of space to others.202
It seems that, perhaps relying on the obiter dictum of the Lotus case, the U.S. 
Government believes that “[t]here is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or 
using weapons in space, applying force from space to Earth or conducting military operations in 
and through space.”203 However, the fallacy of this position from the international law 
perspective is evident, not only because of inapplicability of the Lotus decision to outer space 
activities,204 but also in view of almost unanimous rejection by the international community of 
this position, expressed most recently in the December 2004 UN General Assembly 
Resolution.205 The Resolution recalls “the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international 
relations, including in their space activities.” 
Placing weapons in outer space would pose a significant threat to world peace as well as 
to civilian satellites and could deny access to space in practice to all. According to the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: 
The development, testing and deployment of space-based anti-satellite and ballistic 
missile defense systems, in addition to threatening the current peaceful uses of outer 
space, could also extinguish the explicit right of use of outer space of any nation in favor 
of implicit permission for its use by the first nation to successfully deploy such weapons 
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in outer space. Access to outer space via space launch vehicles might then need to run a 
gauntlet of orbiting space-based weapons.”206
While some States, including Australia, Japan, and the U.K., support at least some 
aspects of the American BMD project,207 China and Russia have consistently been voicing their 
concerns about the weaponization of space, which could in their view trigger a space arms 
race.208 In addition, several European nations, particularly Germany and France, remain 
“unconvinced of [BMD’s] necessity.”209 Canada has consistently opposed all efforts to 
weaponize outer space, including space-based missile defense.210 After lengthy internal policy 
discussions, Canada decided on 24 February 2005 not to join the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense 
system. Canada will continue working with the U.S. through NORAD for the defense of North 
America but will not concentrate on missile defense.211
The probability of a space arms race is real and imminent. The development and eventual 
deployment of an American BMD system or offensive space weapons would create more 
international tensions because it is highly unlikely that the two major space powers that the U.S. 
sees as its principal potential adversaries, Russia and China, will let American space 
‘dominance’ develop unchallenged. In December 2004, the UN General Assembly recognized 
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that “prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international 
peace and security.”212 The General Assembly called upon “all States, in particular those with 
major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space 
and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that 
objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace 
and security and promoting international cooperation.”213 However, as noted above, the U.S. is 
of the opinion that international law contains no prohibition against using conventional weapons 
in space or applying force from space. For that reason, it is reluctant to discuss and negotiate any 
international treaty which might indirectly or even by implication compromise its position. The 
2001 Rumsfeld Commission Report candidly expressed that, “[t]he U.S. must be cautious of 
agreements intended for one purpose that, when added to a larger web of treaties or regulations, 
may have the unintended consequences of restricting future activities in space.”214
Currently, as far as is known, there are no weapons in outer space. However, at least one 
space power is making preparations to use outer space for warfighting, dominance, and control. 
The international community, through the UN, must take an urgent and concerted action to 
prevent a space arms race before it is too late. The standard resolutions obviously remain 
ineffective. A resolution on general principles should be drafted and adopted to clarify and 
strengthen those already included in several treaties governing outer space, particularly the Outer 
Space Treaty, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and to protect its peaceful uses for 
all States. The proposed resolution should expressly and clearly prohibit in time of peace any 
threat or use of force in and from outer space. Article 3 (2) of the 1979 Moon Agreement 
contains a useful precedent for such a prohibition.215 The negotiation for the resolution should be 
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undertaken by the Legal Subcommittee of the COPUOS216 because the decade-long deliberations 
in the Conference on Disarmament continue to remain deadlocked. Eventually, the Conference 
could undertake the negotiation of precise and detailed agreements implementing the principles 
included in the resolution adopted by the COPUOS. It is the right as well as the responsibility of 
the COPUOS to ensure that outer space be used for truly peaceful purposes and to enhance the 
global public interest in outer space for the benefit of all mankind. 
3.5. Legal regime for the Moon and other celestial bodies 217 
The 1979 Moon Agreement that establishes a specific legal regime (though applicable 
only to the States Parties to the Agreement) for the Moon and other celestial bodies is the last of 
the five international treaties that have been negotiated in the Legal Subcommittee of the 
COPUOS. The most important and innovative provision of this treaty deals with equitable 
sharing of the benefits from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon and other 
celestial bodies. Under Article 11 of the Agreement, the Moon, other celestial bodies, and their 
natural resources are declared the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (CHM). The concept of CHM 
was first proposed by Aldo Armando Cocca, representative of Argentina, during the 1967 
discussions in the Legal Subcommittee of the COPUOS. This concept was later taken up by the 
Ambassador of Malta in the discussion on the equitable sharing of the resources of the high seas 
and finally was included in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. For the first time, the 
concept of CHM was transformed into a principle of international law and was included in the 
Moon Agreement in 1979. Under the Agreement, an international régime needs to be established 
to govern the exploitation of natural resources of the Moon. Such a regime must include 
provisions relating to an “equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from 
those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the 
efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of 
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the Moon, shall be given special consideration.”218 This provision of the Moon Agreement needs 
to be respected only after the establishment of a detailed international regime (perhaps covering 
both a expanded treaty and an organization), which is mandated at that point in the future when 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon would be “about to become feasible.” 
Before the establishment of such a regime, the provisions of Article 6 (2) remain applicable. 
They state that: 
In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the provisions of this 
Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to collect on and remove from the 
Moon samples of its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall remain at the 
disposal of those States Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by 
them for scientific purposes. States Parties shall have regard to the desirability of making 
a portion of such samples available to other interested States Parties and the international 
scientific community for scientific investigation. States Parties may in the course of 
scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the Moon in quantities 
appropriate for the support of their missions [emphasis added]. 
Since this provision is supportive of private entities during the period of explorations of 
natural resources of the Moon, one should not read the Moon Agreement as being against private 
initiatives, investment, and interests. Unfortunately, there seems to be misinformation about the 
application of the Moon Agreement, even in some official circles. For example, the U.S. Army 
Space Reference Text on Space Policy and Law mentions that the 1979 Moon Agreement “was 
signed by five countries but not the United States or the Soviet Union. It states that the Moon is a 
common heritage for all mankind which implies that all nations would share equally in any 
benefits derived from Moon exploration. If the U.S. signed this treaty it would be hard to get 
private firms to invest in future Moon projects if they had to divide the profits.”219
While the CHM is the most significant principle of the Moon Agreement, it is also the 
most controversial one. It is generally believed that because of this principle the Moon 
Agreement attracted only a limited number (i.e. eleven) of ratifications. However, the low 
number of ratifications has in fact been primarily due to two other factors: first, the exploration 
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of the Moon has almost ended about thirty years ago; and second, there is a general lack of 
interest in the international space regime, both in developing and developed countries. 
Nevertheless, this situation may change once European States, China, India and others succeed in 
launching their missions to the Moon.220 That development will dramatically alter the 
geopolitical perception of the Moon and a global interest will grow for the development of a 
legal regime to govern the Moon and other celestial bodies. The 2004 American decision to 
resume exploration of the Moon and to use its resources for missions to Mars has already 
rekindled interest in the politics and appropriate regulatory regime for these celestial bodies.221 
The recent ratification of the Moon Agreement by Belgium on 29 June 2004 (effective on 29 
July 2004) may be the start of a new trend in increased interest in Moon exploration and the 1979 
Moon Agreement. Added interest in the Agreement is provided by the activities of several 
private entities in the U.S. and other countries that are ‘selling’ pieces of land on the Moon.222 
Irrespective of the fact that such ‘selling’ has no legal basis,223 global public interest in outer 
space necessitates  that clear rules must be established both at international and national levels. 
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It is impossible to predict whether the nature and scope of the future regime governing 
activities on the Moon will be based exclusively on the current Moon Agreement or on a new 
agreement. Whatever the substance of the future lunar regime, it should include the principle of 
CHM. If the principle of CHM could be retained in the Law of the Sea Convention, there is no 
logical reason for excluding this principle from the future legal regime to govern the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
The Moon Agreement has incorporated global public interest in the exploration and use 
of the Moon and certainly contains a ‘balance of interests’ of the space powers (which would be 
engaged in the exploration and eventual exploitation of natural resources of Moon) and those of 
the rest of the international community. Therefore, all States should ratify the Moon Agreement 
as soon as possible. 
3.6. Comprehensive space treaty 
An informal proposal is before the Legal Subcommittee of the COPUOS recommending 
the drafting of a single comprehensive outer space convention. China, Greece, and the Russian 
Federation have submitted a working paper to that effect.224 This is an interesting initiative and it 
merits serious consideration. The main purpose of existing space treaties has been to establish 
fundamental legal principles to govern the space activities of the States. In general, however, 
these treaties have become outdated due to significant changes in the global geopolitical situation 
and are inadequate to address the challenges posed by increases in the variety of space activities, 
especially those that are being undertaken for commercial purposes. They need to be updated. It 
would be in the interest of all States for the general principles of space law, scattered throughout 
five treaties, to be transformed into a single, consistent, modern, and comprehensive legal 
document to enhance inclusive global public interest and to promote responsible uses of outer 
space. However, the conclusion of a comprehensive space treaty unfortunately might be 
politically risky at this stage. Some States, particularly those with major space capabilities, might 
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use negotiations over the text of a new agreement to weaken some of the key provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty, including those that create global public interest in outer space. 
The adoption by the COPUOS of an additional Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty may 
be an option since it would need to be ratified by only the interested States and not all States 
Parties to the Outer Space Treaty. Such protocol should include (1) the fundamental legal 
principles (particularly those that establish the global public interest) that have already been 
adopted; (2) clear rules of law that would govern all space activities, including those undertaken 
by private entities and covering issues related to space debris, intellectual property rights, etc.; 
(3) unambiguous definitions of the terms used; (4) an efficient dispute settlement mechanism; 
and (5) sufficient provisions for the protocol’s amendment. 
Conclusion 
From the beginning of the space age the international community unambiguously 
recognized a global public interest in outer space.  This involves the obligation of each State to 
explore and use outer space and celestial bodies for the benefit and interests of all countries, 
which accords supremacy for the inclusive interests of the international community over 
exclusive rights of individual States.  It also entails the right of each State to explore and use 
outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, without discrimination of any kind or 
appropriation by any means. However, due to a lack of sufficiently and precisely developed 
international law to protect and enhance global public interest in outer space, some States have 
started adopting national laws and policies to promote their exclusive national benefits and are 
thereby jeopardizing the inclusive interest of the international community. Freedom of use is 
being considered as a license for abuse. Unilateral and exclusive space policies pursued and 
activities undertaken by some States are being rationalized under the principle of (unfettered) 
freedom of use, without due regard to the corresponding interests of other States. Recent 
insistence by certain States on arbitrary interpretation of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty 
(which establishes global public interest in outer space) poses serious challenges to the current 
and future international legal order of outer space and creates grave barriers to the further 




The Outer Space Treaty, which achieves a fair balance of interests among space powers 
and non-space powers by intentionally incorporating numerous innovative legal principles, is not 
only an international agreement of high importance (as the constitution of outer space) 
establishing rule of law in outer space, but also a manifesto of genuine expectations of all 
segments of mankind. It is therefore imperative that not only the letter but also the spirit of the 
Treaty govern space activities of States. Activities contrary to both the spirit and letter of the 
Treaty would shatter the belief in the rule of law and in the international democratic law-making 
process. 
The United Nations’s COPUOS is the appropriate place to tackle most space-related 
problems but progress in the Committee is being blocked by the consensus rule. That rule must 
not be considered sacrosanct, especially when the interests of humankind are at stake. Like-
minded nations that have space programs should become more actively engaged in COPUOS, 
preferably with the support of major space powers, or even without them if it becomes necessary, 
to pursue policy and regulatory initiatives on matters of importance to them and other States. 
Current international space law consists mainly of general principles. Therefore, 
sometimes it is difficult to determine if any particular action, or a series of actions, of a State is 
in violation of any specific provision of an international space treaty, though that action may be 
contrary to the these general legal principles. In certain cases or situations, there may not appear 
to be a specific disagreement that needs to be resolved through the formal legal means of 
international dispute settlement. In addition, States that are adversely affected by such actions 
may feel reluctant to bring that matter before a formal judicial tribunal because of political, 
financial, or other reasons. At the same time, there is no independent and international expert 
body that could adjudge the actions of States with respect to the exploration and use of outer 
space. Therefore, an independent international space law tribunal or panel — which may be 
designated as the International Commission of Space Jurists, or ICSJ — should be established 
with the mandate to express its opinions on specific matters referred to it by any national or 
international public or private entity.225 The proposed tribunal could be created on the same 
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model as the International Commission of Jurists226 or any other similar international 
independent panel of legal experts. The opinions of such a tribunal would be available for use by 
the States members of the Legal Subcommittee of the COPUOS and thus will have extensive 
persuasive value and impact on the further development of international space law. This process 
could also help in protecting and promoting global public interest in outer space, which has been 
the foundation and core of international legal order of outer space. 
In September 2004, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, speaking to 
the General Assembly in New York, portrayed a very dismal current state of the world. The main 
reason for such a situation, according to him, is humanity’s disregard for the rule of law in 
international affairs: 
[T]oday the rule of law is at risk around the world.... At the international level, all States 
— strong and weak, big and small — need a framework of fair rules, which each can be 
confident that others will obey. Just as, within a country, respect for the law depends on 
the sense that all have a say in making and implementing it, so it is in our global 
community. No nation must feel excluded. All must feel that international law belongs to 
them, and protects their legitimate interests.227
The rule of law rather than the rule of force should apply not only to international 
relations on the Earth but also to all activities in and from outer space. The first rationale for the 
creation of the United Nations and the establishment a new global international legal order after 
the devastating Second World War, as mentioned in the Preamble of the UN Charter, was “to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind.” The same rationale should serve as an urgent motivation to uphold 
global public interest in the exploration and use of outer space and even the survival of 
humankind. 
                                                 
226 “The International Commission of Jurists is comprised of sixty lawyers (including senior judges, attorneys 
and academics) dedicated to ensuring respect for international human rights standards through the law. The 
Commissioners are all individuals known for their experience, knowledge and fundamental commitment to human 
rights. The composition of the Commission aims to reflect the gender and geographical diversity of the world and its 
many legal systems”: available at http://www.icj.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=13&lang=en (accessed 18 March 
2005). 
227 “Key extracts: Annan at the UN,” BBC news, 2004/09/21, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/americas/3678030.stm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
